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ABSTRACT 
 
ORIENTALISM AND THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY: KEMALIST 
WOMEN’S DISCOURSES ON KURDISH WOMEN IN THE 1990s 
 
GÖKÇE GÜNDOĞDU 
M.A. Thesis, January 2017 
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ateş Altınordu 
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In Turkish Studies, there has been a strong tendency to analyze the modern history of 
Turkey from the perspective of Westernization. Although this trend preserved its 
impact, the opportunities that arise from this perspective have not been utilized with 
regard to the Kurdish Question. In this thesis, first, I argue that the simultaneous 
projects of Westernization and modernization brought about a certain Orientalist 
attitude towards Turkey’s eastern periphery. In a similar vein, I attempt to refine the 
social engineering theory with the inclusion of Orientalist and Occidentalist theories. I 
employ these theories because of the opportunities they provide to analyze Kemalist 
discourses with a particular emphasis on its developmentalist approach to the the eastern 
region as well as its ambivalent relationship with the West. In this study, I attempt to 
explore the outcomes of the Kemalist trajectory of modernization on the society in 
relation to the representation of Kurds and Kurdish women based on a CHP Pamphlet 
issued by the Women’s Branch on the living conditions of southeastern women in the 
1990s.  
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ÖZET 
 
ŞARKİYATÇILIK VE TÜRKİYE’DE KÜRT MESELESİ:1990’LARDA KÜRT 
KADINLAR HAKKINDA KEMALİST KADINLARIN SÖYLEMLERİ 
 
GÖKÇE GÜNDOĞDU 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2017 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ateş Altınordu 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kemalizm, Şarkiyatçılık, 1990’larda Türkiye, Kürt Kadınlar, Kürt 
Meselesi 
 
Türkiye Çalışmalarında Türkiye’nin modern tarihini Batılılaşma bakış açısı ile 
incelemeye dair güçlü bir eğilim vardır. Bu eğilimin etkisi devam etmiştir, fakat bu 
bakış açısının getirdiği fırsatlar Kürt Meselesi konusunda kullanılmamıştır. Bu tezde 
öncelikle şunu savunacağım: Eş zamanlı Batılılaştırma ve modernleştirme projeleri 
Türkiye’nin doğusundaki kırsal bölgelere Şarkiyatçı bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşılmasına 
sebep olmuştur. Benzer şekilde, sosyal mühendislik teorisini Şarkiyatçılık ve 
Garbiyatçılık teorilerini dahil ederek geliştirmeye çalışacağım; çünkü Kemalist 
söylemin doğu konusundaki kalkınmacı yaklaşımını ve Batı ile kurduğu çelişkili ilişkiyi 
incelerken bu teorileri kullanmak faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışmada Kemalist 
modernleştirme yönteminin toplum üzerindeki sonuçlarını Kürtlerin ve Kürt kadınların 
temsil ediliş biçimlerini, 1998 yılında CHP Kadın Kolları tarafından hazırlanan 
güneydoğulu kadınların yaşam koşullarına ilişkin kitapçık temelinde inceleyeceğim. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General Introduction 
The Kurdish Question has been a controversial topic in Turkish politics since the 
late nineteenth century, and preserves its central place to date. In fact, in light of the 
recent political negotiations starting in 2009 with the Kurdish initiative, the Kurdish 
question has proven to be as persistent and central as ever. However, although the 
Kurdish question is widely debated in politics and studied in academia, its discussion 
has been restricted to the role of the rise of the Kurdish nationalist movement and 
Turkey’s social engineering that had been adopted in the formative years of the 
republican period. While these discussions have been successful in situating the 
question within its larger political background, the Kurdish Question’s repercussions at 
a societal and cultural level have not been studied exhaustively. 
Following the academic strand that traces the roots of the challenges posed by 
the Kurdish Question back to Kemalist nationalist discourse, this thesis will first 
describe the Kemalist approach to nationalism, secularism, and modernism together 
  
2 
with its tense relationship to Islam as the basic tiers of the newly founded republic. I 
conceptualize these tiers as intertwined elements that are the foundations of modern 
Turkey and the modern Turkish identity. This formulation will provide the background 
out of which the Kurdish Question emerged, because Kurds have a unique place among 
other minorities of the country, first because they are not acknowledged as a separate 
ethnic and linguistic minority group but rather, borrowing Mesut Yeğen’s term, as 
“Prospective Turks,” and secondly, because they are Muslims, and finally, because of 
the geography they inhabit.  
The eastern and southeastern regions of the country, in which the Kurds 
constitute the vast majority, are discursively defined as territories that require to be 
reformed with state action. This discourse is best exemplified in various Doğu 
Raporları (Eastern Reports) submitted to the CHP1 (Republican People’s Party) as well 
as to the state in different periods of time. While these reports were aimed at Turkifying 
the people of the region, the methods through which this goal was going to be achieved 
were almost always defined as “reforming” the region to the end that it reaches the same 
development level with the rest of the country. Similarly, certain stereotypical images of 
the people from the east emerged in cultural contexts. To give a few examples as to 
what kind of stereotypical images I am referring to, I can quote the findings of a 
research on the status of eastern women by a professor of sociology, Sevil Öner. The 
research states that “The oriental/eastern woman is neither as free as the Western 
woman, nor ambitious and successful as much as women from Çukurova, nor as 
productive as the Black Sea woman.”2 Another example can be given from a language 
perspective. In Turkish, the word “kıro” refers to “coarseness and being unmannerly” 
with connotations of being non-urban, although it has not found its way to the TDK 
(Turkish Language Association)’s dictionary. The word originally comes from Kurdish 
and means ‘son,’ similar to the word “angut,” which refers to a kind of bird, yet is used 
in Turkish to call someone ‘idiot.’ Although it is not clear how these words came to be 
used in modern slang Turkish, it is important to explore the way words loaned from 
Kurdish have pejorative connotation. There can be found several examples of that on 
                                               
1
 The founding political party and the carrier of the Kemalist ideology. 
2
 Quoted from Milliyet’s article published on April 10, 2000. 
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the cultural arena. My scope in this study, however, is not to trace these expressions 
with negative connotations, but rather to understand the mechanisms that made them 
possible.  
I will argue that the emergence of these stereotypical images about Kurds can be 
better understood when it is put in the context of the Turkish identity quest under the 
modernization process, without suggesting that the Kurdish question can be reduced to 
that. I rather claim that the image of Kurds as “backward” rendered them as the Other of 
the Turkish identity that was a combination of different elements. Kemalist ideology 
will constitute the focus of my study, because it is the defining ideology of the Turkish 
identity. While Turkish identity, especially vis-à-vis its Western Other, was not clearly 
defined, the constructed image of Kurds helped to its definition. Through this 
summation, while Turks gained a better-defined Self, Kurds emerged as their Other. 
The construction of images of Kurds, imbued with negative connotations, I argue, paved 
the way for the construction of a new Turkish identity by demarcating Turkish people 
from Kurds. Secondly, these images justified and consolidated the hierarchical power 
relations that had an Orientalist character.  
Concomitantly, I will argue that the creation of a Turkish identity was very 
much impacted by Turkey’s modernization process on the model of the West. The 
relationship between the Turkish identity and the West has been ambivalent, because it 
both carries an admiration and inferiority vis-a-vis the West starting with the last 
periods of the Ottoman Empire. The circles of betrayal by the West had a significant 
bearing on the development of the nationalist psyche of the Turkish modernizers, which 
I will situate within the framework of Occidentalism. The Kurdish question and its 
relation to Turkey’s accession to the European Union will be analyzed as instances 
where Occidentalism is at play.  
 Finally, against this historical and social background, I will explore the 
positions of Kurdish women assuming that they must be doubly affected by the question 
at stake, both because of the denial of Kurdish identity in general and the disadvantages 
of not being able to benefit from Turkish modernization reforms addressing women in 
particular. CHP will be the focus of my analysis because of two reasons. First, it is the 
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founding political party of the republic which stayed in power until 1950. It is the 
political party which gave Turkey its ideological contours. Second, it is a political party 
that defines itself as the safeguard of Turkey’s development and modernization.3 Third, 
CHP has always approached the Kurdish question from the perspective of economic and 
social underdevelopment (Uysal 2013: 28). Considering women’s symbolic role in the 
dissemination of Kemalist ideology as well, I will embark on a discourse analysis of a 
CHP pamphlet on the circumstances of women in the eastern parts of Turkey, published 
in the 1990s. My decision to focus on the 1990s arises mainly from the increasing 
challenge the Kurdish question posed to the state during this time. In the analysis of the 
CHP pamphlet, I seek to avoid approaching Kurdish women’s experiences and the 
stance of CHP women as monoliths. 
1.1.1. Aim and Methodology 
The primary inspiration for this study on Orientalism in the Kurdish question in 
Turkey stems from the work of historian Ussama Makdisi. Makdisi argues in his 2002 
article “Ottoman Orientalism was a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced in the 
nineteenth-century during Ottoman reforms that implicitly or explicitly acknowledged 
the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theater of 
backwardness” (Makdisi 2002: 769). His argument that the modernization period in the 
nineteenth century brought about a new kind of difference between the rulers and their 
subjects, especially in the Arabic lands, guided me in considering the Kurdish question 
from that perspective. According to Makdisi, while in the classical age the difference in 
the society was marked by a difference in religion and ethnicity, with the rise of the 
nineteenth century, difference within the empire began to be measured by geographical 
and temporal difference, marked primarily by the underdevelopment of the Arabic 
lands, which was endowed vis-à-vis this image with an unbridgeable nature (Ibid: 773). 
This analysis triggered my interest in the existence of a similar geographical and 
temporal difference between the western and eastern parts of Turkey in the state’s 
                                               
3
 http://dijitalmecmua.chp.org.tr/PageMecmua.aspx?Mecmua=5#p=37 
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discourse as well as in Kemalist ideology. As Makdisi further argues that the eastern 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, especially Mount Lebanon, inhabited by Arabs 
served as “proving grounds” for Ottoman modernism. Drawing on Makdisi’s argument, 
I developed an interest in exploring if we can observe a similar Orientalist tendency in 
the handling of the Kurdish question in modern day Turkey. Inspired by above-
mentioned theory of Ottoman Orientalism, this study aims to provide a complementary 
perspective on the Kurdish question in Turkey, as it is generally analyzed from the 
perspective of social engineering and nationalism in the literature without a 
consideration of geographical and temporal endowments stemming from the 
problematic modernist binaries of the West and the East.  
This study is based on two primary sources. One is the memoir of Sıdıka Avar, 
which is gathered in a book entitled Dağ Çiçeklerim (2004). Dağ Çiçeklerim provides a 
good example of Kemalism’s instrumentalization of women and education in 
implementing its Turkification policies on Kurds. Although the book exemplifies 
Kemalist Orientalism par excellence, the fact that it revolves around the Dersim 
question, which is distinguished from the rest of the territories populated by Kurds, 
renders it a work that has a special place in the general framework of the Kurdish 
question.
4
 Still, I believe that it is an important source that demonstrates Orientalism at 
work in Turkey at its peak, especially considering the Turkish state’s fierce way of 
“tackling the question.”  
The second and main primary source of this study is the CHP pamphlet issued in 
1998 by the CHP Women’s Branch. The pamphlet analyses living conditions of women 
in the southeastern regions. As a period when the Kurdish question gained a central 
place in the Turkish politics shaped by the tense clash between the Turkish state and 
Kurdish guerilla forces, the 1990s were the testimony to the inevitability of facing the 
                                               
4
 An extensive analysis of Dağ Çiçeklerim that situates the book in its general historical background is Zeynep 
Türkyılmaz’s Master’s Thesis “Nationalizing Through Education: The Case of ‘Mountain Flowers’ in Elazığ 
Education Institute” (2001). To give one example specific to the Dersim case, in this research, Türkyılmaz quotes a 
speech by Atatürk in 1936 which reads: “Our most important interior problem is the Dersim problem. No matter at 
what cost, we have to remove this abscess at its roots” (Quoted in Türkyılmaz: 45). Five months after the delivery of 
this speech, the Turkish military operation in Dersim began, which results, according to the official records, in the 
removal of 7954 people from the region (dead or alive) and the relocation of 3500 people in different parts of Turkey 
(Türkyılmaz 2001: 45). Hence, the significance of Dağ Çiçeklerim, which narrates the memories of a Turkish teacher 
in the region for the daughters of the “revolted” Kurds.  
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Kurdish question for the Kemalists. Using this background as a foundation, a discourse 
analysis of the Kemalist women will be conducted in order to see to what extent the 
Orientalist discourses in the formative years of the republic are transformed, and to what 
extent they continue to define the relationship between Kemalist and Kurdish women. 
While the pamphlet is the primary document used in this analysis, research on the CHP 
Women’s Branch—the first women’s organization with the affiliation of a political 
party—has also proven to be a dearth of secondary literature.5 Hence, I made use of a 
CHP report entitled “Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’s problems,” published in 1989, 
when Deniz Baykal was the general secretary of the SHP. This report was originally 
entitled “Social Democratic Popular Party's Views on the Eastern and Southeastern 
Anatolia Problem and a Solution Proposal,” and was originally penned for the Social 
Democratic Popular Party (SHP). When this report was issued, Deniz Baykal was the 
leader of the SHP. In 1992, however, following the lift of the law that prevented the 
reopening of closed political parties with the same name, the CHP was reopened and 
united with the SHP under the name CHP. Following this unification, CHP published 
the report’s sections related to democratization. Considering that both the time frame 
and the focus of these reports correspond to one another, I compared and contrasted 
these two reports to illustrate to what extent they employ Orientalist methods.  
Apart from the primary sources, I made use of secondary literature on 
Orientalism as well as Orientalism in the Ottoman and Turkish context. Edward Said’s 
concept of Orientalism is the main theoretical source of this study. Historian Ussama 
Makdisi’s argument argument that the modernization period in the nineteenth century 
brought about a new kind of difference between the rulers and their subjects, especially 
in the Arabic lands, has been one of the by main secondary sources to examine the 
Kurdish question from that perspective.  
In the third chapter, I consulted the feminist literature on the Kemalist reforms 
targeting women, because feminist critics enable one to better understand the values 
with which Kemalism construed Kemalist women. As Kemalist women’s discourses on 
                                               
5
 The only secondary source I could reach was a study conducted by Mustafa Çadır (2011), “The Role of Political 
Parties’ Women’s Branches in Women’s Participation in Politics,” reached at 
http://kadininstatusu.aile.gov.tr/data/542a8e0b369dc31550b3ac30/mustafa_cadir_tez.pdf 
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Kurdish women is the focus of this study, the critiques on how Kemalist saw women 
and what kind of a relationship it formed with women will provide us with the 
necessary background of what created the women profile of Kemalism. 
Inspired by above-mentioned theory of Ottoman Orientalism, this study aims at 
providing a new perspective to the Kurdish question in Turkey, which is generally 
analyzed from the perspective of social engineering and Turkish nationalism in the 
literature. By doing so, it hopes to complement the existing literature by emphasizing 
the role discourse of the leading parties, the state, and the mainstream media. For, these 
discourses help to justify the what social engineering and nationalism puts into practise 
and reproduces them.  
1.1.2. Outline 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides theoretical introduction 
to the eastern and southeastern regions in Turkey that are discursively defined as 
“underdeveloped” and “backward” territory. Having presented the basic discourses in 
regard to the eastern and southeastern regions, a brief outline of the key concepts in the 
Turkish modernization period is provided. Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical 
frameworks of Orientalism and Occidentalism as conceptual tools that can be 
productively used in understanding the background of the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
Chapter 3 questions Kemalists’ definition of Kemalism as a “gender progressive” 
ideology, which paved the way for Kemalist women to define themselves as the symbol 
of the reforms and development. With the help of the discussions of how these reforms 
become a source of pride for Kemalist women, this chapter illustrates the 
complicity/manufactured consent of the Orientalist gaze towards the West by situating 
Kemalist women as a group who have internalized the role of civilizing the eastern 
regions. The memoirs of Sıdıka Avar, a teacher who worked for twenty years in towns 
where Kurds constitute the majority, are the embodiment of this civilizing mission “at 
its best.” Chapter 4 builds upon this civilizing mission, which has strong Orientalist 
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tendencies, and explores to what extent Kemalist women’s stance towards eastern 
women changed and to what extent it remained intact in the 1990s based on the 
discourse analysis of a CHP pamphlet issued by the women's branch on the conditions 
of southeastern women. The decision to focus on the 1990s is because this period 
witnessed substantial challenges to the state's basic tenets of unitary state and 
secularism. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the discussions in the 
previous chapters by situating the cultural dimension of the Kurdish question as one of 
the complexities that arise from ‘Modernization’ in a non-Western context.  
1.2. Historical Background of Westernization in Turkey 
In order to situate the Kurdish question in the Turkish modernization process, I 
will present a brief background of the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the 
modern Turkish republic. As the leaders of Turkish modernization, I will start with the 
Young Turks, who are considered to be the progenitors of the Kemalists. Similar to the 
Young Turks, Kemalists had been arbiters of the definition of what modernism is and 
how deeply it is rooted in the West. The central place of the image of the West in 
Kemalism leads this study to also consider the function of Orientalism and 
Occidentalism in the Kurdish question. Understanding the significance of Orientalism 
and Occidentalism in Turkey requires a reconstruction of Turkey’s ambivalent 
relationship with the West starting from the last periods of the Ottoman Empire.  
Under the influence of Kemalist doctrines, Turkey conceptualized a 
modernization on the model of the West so much so that modernization came to be 
equated with Westernization. Westernization has come to be considered as one of the 
most significant milestones in the study of Turkey’s history. Before embarking on a 
detailed description of the role Westernization/Modernization played in the history of 
Turkey, I will try to set the ground for the way in which modernization slid into the 
subconscious of Turkishness and its subsequent relationship with Kemalists. Given that 
there is an inextricable relationship between Westernization and Islam in the Turkish 
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context, my preliminary framework will try to explore the ties between modernism, 
nationalism, and religion.  
1.2.1. Islam 
Explaining the Ottoman modernization process is definitely not an easy task, 
because it was a combination of many forces that interacted with each other and 
involved certain reform measures (Kamali 2006: 81). Since a more extensive 
modernization process started during the “Young Ottoman” movement, I will start by 
drawing a brief outline of that movement’s relationship with Islam. The Young Ottoman 
movement was originally created by young and middle-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats 
who had a ‘common knowledge of European civilization’ in 1865 (Mardin 1962). 
Ironically enough, they gathered around an urge to react to the loss of power vis-à-vis 
the West. Originally, the central idea of the Young Ottomans was that reforms should 
not be based on an imitation of the West, but on a true and modern understanding of 
Islam. This idea was based on the premise that Islam was a rational religion and it 
would welcome scientific innovation. Moreover, it suggested that in its original form 
the Islamic community had been an “embryonic democracy” (Mardin 1961). However, 
by 1908, the Young Turks, who were the progenitors of Kemalism (Ahmad 1993; 
Mardin 2006; Zürcher 2004), came to have an opposite opinion of Islam. The Young 
Turks, in general terms, let alone seeing Islam as a modern and rational religion like the 
Ulema, interpreted it as a source of backwardness. That is, from a Eurocentric point of 
view, the Islamic tradition started to be seen as the cause of the country’s poverty and 
slow growth.  
However, the political circumstances came to force the Young Turks to 
acknowledge other things: The experiences in the Balkan Wars and the fact that 
virtually the entire European portion of the Empire was lost signaled to the Turkish 
nationalists that they would not be able to forge a nationalist spirit without reference to 
religion. Just restoring the loyalty to the ideals of the 1908 revolution was insufficient. 
With this realization, the Young Turks started to look for an instrumental Islam that 
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could be kept under the control of the state, being used in its service. Religion was 
instrumentalized for the sake of nationalism. This new understanding of Islam was to be 
subservient to the overall ideals of Turkish nationalism and the foremost expectation 
from Islam was to fulfill the unifying role that was assigned to it. This kind of an 
instrumental approach to religion was going to be increasingly utilized during the 
national struggle, as the lack of a nationalist ideal that could create “cohesion” among 
the community could not be overcome until the proclamation of the republic (Tunçay 
2001). After the national struggle, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk started to declare his opinion 
about Islam, emphasizing that he was not against Islam, arguing that Islam was “the 
most rational and natural among religions” (Zürcher 2001: 46). He rather tried to 
abolish the intermediaries between believers and Islam. In his speeches where he uttered 
his stance against the Ulema, he also expressed his concern about irtica. This concept 
referred to a radical religious reactionism against the dissemination of Western values.  
The pertinence of this unclear and ambivalent (Çelik 2001: 87) relationship 
between Islam and Westernization will be studied here at two levels. The first is that 
Islam was a defining element of both Ottoman and Turkish identity until the 
construction of the instrumental relationship with Islam. This new and ambivalent 
relationship created a certain loss/gap in the social identity. Borrowing historian and 
political scientist Benedict Anderson’s (1983) insightful term, Islam was no longer a 
constant of the new “imagined community,” although this was not pronounced openly 
by the Kemalist founders of country. This is doubly important, because the new 
milestone of the national identity of the imagined community was envisioned to be 
Western values. In that sense, the way Westernization and Islamic identity were 
conceptualized as being in binary opposition was setting the stage for the search of a 
new identity by the founders of Kemalist ideology and their paradoxical relationship 
with the West.  
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1.2.2. Ottoman and Turkish Elites 
After the foundation of the Turkish republic, the Kemalists rose to power and 
took over the project of modernization they inherited mostly from the Young Turks. As 
Frey pointed “the Kemalist revolution was both the continuation and culmination of 
Turkey’s historic struggle over modernization. It resulted in the victory of the 
modernizers and effective general modernization of the national elite” (Frey 1975: 59). 
They were the winners and their vigorous attempts at modernization and Westernization 
carried a Jacobin character, which did not leave sufficient room for opposing ideas 
(Tunçay 2001). In the case of Turkish politics, these opposing ideas would come from 
the traditional and religious base of the society.  
The Kemalist elite’s method was, more often than not, to see this societal base as 
a nebulous mass that should be shaped by the Kemalist elites. Frey conceptualizes this 
method as a “tendency of a small privileged sector to dominate society and, consciously 
or unconsciously, to regard its domination as legitimate and desirable because of the 
cultural or intellectual inadequacy it attributed to non-elite elements.” (Frey 1975: 43). 
The reform measurements had to be carried out even when they contradicted the 
people’s will (Çelik 2001: 77). The divide between the elite and non-elite, inevitably, 
created a fragmentation in the structure of society. That fragmentation found its best 
expression in Mardin’s center and periphery cleavage. The elite in question in the early 
periods of the republic was one that had its roots in Ottoman society, which falls into 
the “center” in Şerif Mardin’s key theory of center and periphery when explaining the 
social structure of the Ottoman Empire. The elite in Turkey carry many similar traits 
with the influential intelligentsia that emerged during the latter half of the nineteenth 
and the first years of the twentieth century, assuming a characteristic of modernization 
throughout the republican era (Frey 1975: 44). 
Finally, Kemalists envisioned a modernization pattern through Westernization, 
which can be described as the “core” of that ideology (Çelik 2001: 75). However, 
Kemalists’ relation with the West was far from being seamless. It expressed itself both 
in the form of an “object of desire” and “a source of frustration” (Ahıska 2003). When 
the pendulum hit the “object of desire,” the West emerged in the Kemalist 
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consciousness almost always as a ‘train’ to be caught (Ahıska 2003). A sociologist who 
studied Occidentalism in Turkey at length, Meltem Ahıska contends that the metaphor 
of “catching the train of modern civilization” is striking because it created a persistent 
anxiety that had been haunting the society since the eighteenth century (2003), which 
will be the base of the discussion of Occidentalism in the second chapter.  
1.2.3. Turkification 
Both the internal and external policies of the last period of the Ottoman Empire 
and the early period of the Turkish Republic are marked by the rising nationalist 
movements and reflexes developed against them. The first reflex the empire developed 
vis-à-vis the rising nationalist movements was to pursue a strategic policy around the 
idea of embracing all the millets
6
 living in the empire by giving them gradually 
increasing prerogatives beginning with the declaration of Tanzimat regulations in 1839. 
This attempt to embrace plurality in the empire in a more satisfying and modern sense 
was mostly a necessity of the situation considering the escalating discontent among the 
millets across the lands of the empire. The solution imperial politics brought to these 
undesirable developments was the introduction of the ideology of Ottomanism. After the 
Balkan Wars, however, Ottomanism had already proven futile in keeping the nations 
together and was replaced by the ideology of Turkification (Somel 200: 112).  
The penetration of nationalist ideologies into ethnic groups in the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19
th
 century was doubly important for the empire, because the great 
powers assumed the position of warrantor of minority rights in the empire. Although the 
Ottoman Empire considered the constitution as an ultimate end of discussions of reform 
in the Christian areas of the empire (Zürcher 2004, 74), the defeat in the Balkan Wars 
and the years of the War of Independence marked and disclosed the cleavages between 
the non-Muslim minorities and the Muslim majority, as a result of which ferocious 
Turkification projects began to be implemented. The years of WWI “gave the 
                                               
6
 Here I refer to the millet system, by which I mean the minority groups living under their own religious authority in 
the era of the Ottoman Empire. For a detailed discussion of the millet system, see Braude, Benjamin and Lewis, 
Bernard, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (1982).  
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Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) the opportunity to obtain dictatorial powers 
and carry through and expand their schemes of social engineering” (Üngör 2008: 24). 
Turks in power had started to pursue “ethnic majoritarian population politics” and thus 
breached with the Ottoman imperial statecraft. The idea behind the project was basically 
increasing the population of the majority at the expense of the minority in different 
ways including cultural assimilation, linguistic and economic nationalism etc. (Üngör 
1998: 24), thereby creating a more homogenous population and a stronger state.  
In that social engineering project, the Ottoman Empire’s eastern provinces held a 
special place, because they were already “a contested territory under the forces of both 
imperial competitions and various nationalisms.” Hence, it had to be “re-won” through 
coercive CUP projects (Üngör 1998: 20). A very important example of this is the forced 
deportations of the Armenians and Kurds in the first fifteen years of the twentieth 
century. Regarding this social engineering project, Kieser argued that “in the Young 
Turk era the notion of “modernity” became a discourse legitimizing the use of state 
violence” (quoted in Üngör 1998: 19). Last but not least, while in the CUP period the 
victims of state violence included many ethnic groups including Armenians, Syriacs and 
European Muslims (Üngör 1998, 17), in the Turkish Republic era, only the Muslim 
‘minority’ of the population in eastern Turkey had remained as a result of the violent 
state policies during the CUP period.  
It is in this context that Kurds came to constitute the major Muslim “minority” 
ethnic group in the eastern regions of Turkey. They were not given a minority status, 
because according to the Lausanne Treaty (1923), a minority status was only relegated 
to the non-Muslim community (Karimova and Deverell 2001). Although the term 
“minority” is a relative one, following Kirişçi and Winrow, in this study, on a 
theoretical level, I will use the term minority to refer to a group “that strives to continue 
its existence and identity with self-consciousness” and “self-determination” (Kirişçi and 
Winrow 1997: 35). On a practical level, countries might be willing to acknowledge the 
existence of religious minorities within their own territories, but the same willingness 
might not apply to the case of an ethnic group that shares the same religion with the 
sovereign ethnic group (36). The case of Kurds falls into this category.  
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More importantly, mainly due to the fact that Kurds are a Muslim group, they 
were keenly considered to be “prospective Turks” (Yeğen 2009),7 which can be argued 
to be a continuation of the millet system mentality. According to the 1924 constitution, 
in the first years of the republic, all inhabitants of Turkey were Turks. However, a 
remnant of the millet system, there was also a second, less inclusive definition of what a 
Turk was. This new definition was best articulated in highbrow works, textbooks, and 
CHP documents of the 1930s (Çağaptay 2006: 159). In this framework, “Islam was an 
avenue toward Turkishness” (159). The final and least inclusive definition of 
Turkification under High Kemalism was “ethno-religious” and, according to Çağaptay, 
was best observed in the day-to-day acts of the state (159). What differentiates Kurds 
from the rest of the Muslim population in Turkey is attributed to three major factors 
suggested by political scientist Soner Çağaptay, who wrote extensively on Kurds in 
Turkey. According to him, first, in the first years of the republican period, the eastern 
and southeastern regions are characterized by being a large, contiguous territory where 
Kurds constitute an overwhelming majority (Çağaptay 2006: 19). Second, compared to 
Kurds, the rest of Muslims were demographically insignificant according to the 1927 
census (19). The next largest groups in these regions were Arabs and Circassians. 
However, their population amounted to less than one percent of the population in each 
of these regions. Thirdly, Kurds diverged from the rest of Muslims because they did not 
identify “so strongly with the Turkish-Muslim ethnie of the Ottoman Empire” (19). 
Çağaptay defines their status in the Ottoman era as follows: “Throughout the Ottoman 
era, the Kurds had lived in Kurdistan, a rugged, autonomous area, which had been 
considered part of the Ottoman fringe. They had not generally associated with the 
Ottoman state or Turkish-Muslim ethnie. Traditionally, the Kurds had been subsidiary 
to this community”8 (19). The rugged and autonomous area Çağaptay refers to will 
constitute one of the basis of the theory of Orientalism in the Kurdish question 
discussed in Chapter 2. Çağaptay further argues that although Kurds started to ally with 
the Turkish-Muslim ethnie of the empire in tandem with rise of Armenian nationalism, 
they remained in the peripheries (19). 
                                               
7
 In the same article, Mesut Yeğen argues that in the 2000s, because of the remarkable developments in Turkish 
politics, the Turkish state’s approach changed from approaching Kurds as “prospective Turks” to “pseudo-citizens.” 
8
 Emphasis mine.  
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Also with the help of the political conjuncture that necessitated the rise of 
nationalist ideologies, Kurds have been subject to assimilationist practices of 
citizenship. While in theory they have been treated as proper members of the Turkish 
nation in terms of citizenship, in practice, the definition of Turkish citizenship has 
oscillated between the domination of ethnic and political perspectives (Yeğen 2009). As 
a result, formal status did not truly reflect the ambiguous perception of Kurds by the 
Turkish state. This discourse rather attempted to obscure the tension between Turkish 
and Kurdish nationalism and served to justify the assimilationist and developmentalist 
approaches of the Turkish state towards the Kurds. Therefore, it appears quite possible 
to argue that Kurds are treated as an informal minority group whose linguistic minority 
status is not legally acknowledged. Especially the fact that they constitute the majority 
of the population in the eastern and southeastern regions has thus made me treat Kurds 
as a “majority” minority within the framework of this study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPASSE OF ORIENTALISM AND OCCIDENTALISM 
“[In Turkey] for now, we 
have two classes: the 
Western class and the 
Eastern class. We want all 
the classes to become 
Western. However, we do 
not want them to be 
contaminated by the 
diseases of the countries in 
the West.”9  
Falih Rıfkı Atay 
2.1. Introduction 
Having provided a brief introduction to the key concepts of Turkish 
modernization period, which, by and large, was built upon a Western model, I would 
like to turn to the Kurdish population in Turkey and situate them within the theoretical 
framework of Orientalism and Occidentalism, which can be productively used to 
understand the complexities arising from the problematic implementation of the Turkish 
                                               
9
 Quoted from Hande Özkan in Kemalizm (2001), İletişim Yayınları. p. 69. Translation mine.  
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modernization project. Şerif Mardin’s (2006), Ussama Makdisi’s (2002), Fatma Müge 
Göçek’s (2013), and Selim Deringil’s (2003) evaluations on Orientalism and 
Occidentalism will serve as the theoretical framework for this section. I will attempt to 
discuss which of these frameworks are the strongest in explaining social and cultural 
fragmentations, and in which contexts. Based on the background that these theoretical 
frameworks provide, this chapter will attempt to explore the opportunities that post-
colonialism provides in understanding the specificities of Turkey’s experience with 
modernity in a non-Western context. Finally, I will give a brief discussion of how the 
Kurdish Question fits into that picture. I will argue that Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery 
cleavage still serves as a useful concept in understanding current Turkish society.  
On the other hand, I will claim that his observations are true, but too general to 
explain the Kurdish Question. Although Mardin has no claim of exploring the Kurdish 
Question, one can draw on his theories and can come to terms with the reception of the 
Kurdish Question. Mardin’s center-periphery cleavage is an insightful exploration of the 
roots of the social and cultural segmentation, and the Kurdish Question is a small but 
very central case, which very well exemplifies this cleavage. I argue that Mardin was 
right in his discovery of the center-periphery cleavage. However, in the case of the 
Turkish Republic, this theory can be refined with the inclusion of the concepts of 
Orientalism and Occidentalism. These frameworks are more promising in exploring the 
complexities that arose during the transformation of Ottoman civilization into a modern 
civilization, with all its ambivalences and paradoxes. Hence, I will adopt a mixture of 
these two theoretical frameworks.  
 Within this framework, I will approach the Kurdish Question not solely as a 
Kurdish nationalist movement, but also as a cultural reaction to the center-periphery 
cleavage, as it is the case in many nationalist movements. My starting point will be the 
fact that the Kurdish Question is a subdivision of what Mardin defines as the 
“periphery.” In the 1980s, alongside the major post-coup developments in the politics 
including the rise of Islamic movement, Kurdish Question as a movement from the 
periphery posed a significant challenge to the Turkish state politics, increasing its 
impacts on the unfolding new social positionings. It can even be said that the Kurdish 
Question is only a single facet of the “periphery.” The Kurdish armed struggle erupted 
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out of this accumulated cleavage in the 1980s. However, this eruption tended to be 
considered as merely a national identity struggle in academia, if not as “separatism”, 
and as “terror” in mainstream media and political discourse. Strength of what these 
expressions obscured one more time the historicity of the cultural and social tension that 
has been accumulating between Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms, which is almost 
always the case when nationalism is in question. My contribution to the literature will 
be to provide more examples for the theory about the dissolution of the center-periphery 
cleavage from the Kurdish Question that began to be in effect in the post-1980 period. 
Bringing the center and periphery cleavage together with the atmosphere of the 1990s 
will provide me with the opportunity to complement the existing literature with the 
inclusion of the interaction between discourse and culture. The problems in these 
approaches to the Kurdish Question resulted in missing out on the possibility of 
reconciliation.  
2.2. Orientalism 
A very contested term, Orientalism can be defined as a certain type of discourse 
that draws borders between East and West. Although Edward Said’s book Orientalism 
(1978) popularized the term, it was in currency before Said’s book appeared, with 
Anuoar Abdel-Malek’s (1963) work, “Orientalism in Crisis.” However, the term was 
introduced to academia through Said’s seminal book. Its reception was far from being 
unified, creating many schisms about its interpretation. A very important example is the 
public debate between Said and Bernard Lewis.
10
 Although many scholars illustrated 
some weaknesses of Said’s argument, in this chapter I will employ the term as Said 
himself defined, considering the contentious ground of the terms as a testimony to its 
power. 
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 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2537089?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
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2.2.1. The Theoretical Framework of Orientalism According to Edward Said 
Said draws his general framework a catalogue of discourse analysis of many 
Orientalists from various genres ranging from Hugo and Nerval to Dante and Kipling.
11
 
He defines the scope of Orientalism as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is 
based on the Orient’s special place in the European and Western experience (Said 1978: 
1). In this system, Orientalism functions through three interdependent channels: first, 
through academic institutions; second, through the ontological and epistemological 
distinction between the Orient and Occident; and third, the relation between Europe and 
the Orient is defined in geographical, historical, and linguistic terms as follows: “The 
Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest 
and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, 
and one of the most recurring images of the Other” (Said 1978: 1). He argues that with 
the introduction of colonization, these various relations accumulated to create “[...] a 
style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident.’” This distinction turned into a tool that helped 
“to define Europe” (Said 1978: 1) and a means for dominating and reconstructing and 
having authority over the Orient (Said 1978: 3).  
While Said is looking at the Orientalists, he notices the ambitious production of 
knowledge about the Orient, especially in the nineteenth century. The problematic 
approach to the Orient lies in the fact that “[...] a large mass of writers [...] have 
accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate 
theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, 
its people, customs, ‘mind’, ‘destiny, and so on” (Said 1978: 2). According to him, the 
Orientalists adopted an essentialist approach to the Orient and presupposed that it was 
ontologically different from the Occident, which created the drive to produce 
knowledge of the Orient and disseminate it. Out of these descriptions, Europe emerged 
more as a sign of “power over the Orient than it is a veridic discourse about the Orient” 
                                               
11
 Said’s theory of Orientalism is criticized by many scholars on the grounds that it is based on a vast period of time 
encompassing the ancient and the middle ages. For an example, see Ernest Gellner (1993). 
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(Said 1978: 6). As a result, this power came to express itself as the authority to represent 
the Orient. Historian A. L. Macfie recounts as follows:  
The Orientalist, through his writing, ‘creates’ the Orient. In this process, 
he assists in the creation of a series of stereotypical images, according to 
which Europe (the West, the ‘self’) is seen as essentially rational, 
developed, humane, superior, authentic, active, creative, and masculine 
while the Orient (the East, the ‘Other’)(a sort of surrogate, underground 
version of the West) is seen as being irrational, aberrant, backward, 
crude, despotic, inferior, inauthentic, passive, feminine, and sexually 
corrupt. Together, they contribute to the construction of a “saturating 
hegemonic system, designed consciously or unconsciously, to dominate, 
restructure and have authority over the orient (Macfie 2000: 8). 
Having drawn out Said’s tenets of Orientalism, I would now like to point out 
some instances that pertain particularly to the case of the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
The first striking point is the way in which the Orientalists’ imagination depicts the 
Orient as a “lamentably alien” entity. Including the other peoples considered as 
degenerate in the West as well, Said explains the way the Orientals are viewed by the 
Orientalists as an admonishment:  
Along with other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, 
uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework 
constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political 
admonishment. The Oriental was linked thus to elements in Western 
society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an 
identity best described as lamentably alien (Said 1978: 207).  
It is this quotation that designated Orientalism as not only a term that addresses 
Orientals but also other marginalized groups in society with the same demarcation and 
sharp diverseness in its discourse, in this case leading us to the Kurdish question in 
Turkey. As I will exemplify and support with the theoretical framework below, I argue 
that a similar approach of demarcation can be observed in the Turkish state’s discourse 
regarding Kurds. As will be argued more substantially in the following pages, similar 
methods of “moral-political admonishment” towards Kurds, the discourse of their 
“lamentably alien” character, and finally an authoritative attitude against them were 
employed. I claim that this is a consequence of the “borrowed” character of modernity 
from the West. 
  
21 
As designated by Said, Orientalism almost always refers to a production of 
knowledge about its object. Regarding Kurds, Turkish state ideology employed this 
method of knowledge production through various reports on the eastern and 
southeastern regions. One of these reports is the report submitted by the chief civil 
inspector Hamdi Bey to the ministry of internal affairs in 1926. He states the danger he 
foresees in the Dersim region as follows: “According to the impressions my contacts in 
the region left on me, Dersim is getting increasingly Kurdified and the danger is 
growing day by day” (Mumcu 1993: 29). According to Hamdi Bey, the problem would 
be solved by opening schools, making roads, establishing factories with the ultimate 
goal of bringing civilization to the region. In his own words, the people of the region 
“are under the influence of ignorance, financial difficulties, internal and external 
deceptions, tendencies of Kurdishness, [...] and feelings of revenge.” Hence, “they are 
putty in the hands of the sheikhs and aghas” (29). In the following years, after the 
suppression of the Dersim uprising, the regional governor of Diyarbakır reported the 
conditions of the region. In 1930, the public inspector İbrahim Tali Bey issued another 
report on the region, which suggests isolating Dersim from its surroundings in order to 
compel people to surrender due to starvation. The General of the army, Fevzi Çakmak, 
was pointing out the same “undeveloped” quality of the people of the region: they were 
ignorant. To resolve this, he proposed the same measures: construction of the roads, 
collection of the arms in the region, etc. (Mumcu 1993: 34). He concluded his report by 
urging the state to handle Dersim as a colony (35). Even though the state operation in 
Dersim was so harsh that it could be categorized literally as colonization based on the 
above-mentioned accounts, these reports of the region demonstrate, at least, the zeal and 
necessity of knowledge production in the region very well. They also reveal the way 
reports, which were imbued with the motivation of Turkification, consolidate the 
tendency to identify eastern and southeastern regions as places that require radical 
reforms. It is also important to note that these reports were neither restricted to Dersim 
nor to that period of time as will be explained in the fourth chapter.  
Turkish state ideology’s Orientalism can also be traced to the definition of 
Turkish nationalism that excludes other ethnic identities within the borders of Turkey 
and demands a denial of these excluded identities. Bound by this restriction of Turkish 
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nationalism, Turkish state ideology created the right setting for a discourse of the 
Kurds’ “sensuality, tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of 
inaccuracy, its backwardness” (Said 1978: 205), as was referred by Çakmak’s outright 
description of Kurds as “ignorant.” This description accounts for the way the eastern 
regions of Turkey are essentially considered to be as the backwater of its dynamic and 
progressive western parts. Finally, I will argue that the Orientalising attitude becomes 
more meaningful when we take into account that Said amended his own theory of 
Orientalism by adding that Orientalism is reinforced when “the modern Orient, in short, 
participates in its own Orientalizing” by the attitudes and discourses of the intelligentsia 
of the Orient (Said 1978: 325). 
2.3. Occidentalism 
There seems to be much less consensus regarding Occidentalism’s definition. Its 
most prevalent connotation is “anti-Westernism” (Ahıska 2008). The term’s 
popularization is traced to Buruma and Mergalit’s book Occidentalism: The West in the 
Eyes of its Enemies (2004). For Buruma and Margalit, the term refers to “[T]he 
dehumanizing picture of the West painted by its enemies [...]” (Buruma and Margalit 
2004: 6). Hence, they embark on interrogating the clusters of prejudice against the West 
and tracing them to their historical roots. According to their treatment of the term, 
“Occidentalism, like capitalism, Marxism, and many other modern -isms, was born in 
Europe, before it was transferred to other parts of the world" (Buruma and Mergalit 
2004). Although Buruma and Margalit acknowledge the significant impact Western 
modernity made on non-Western contexts such as Turkey, Japan, and Russia, they miss 
out on the opportunity to see what kinds of complexities and ambivalences this impact 
led to in their respective societies. Their treatment of Occidentalism is deficient in the 
sense of acknowledging the reciprocity at stake. Whilst Occidentalism referred to a kind 
of threat to the core values of modernity from its ‘enemies’ for Buruma and Margalit, 
some non-Westerners such as Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi, made sense of it as 
a “response to the colonizing West” (Ahıska 2008). In Hanafi’s conceptualization, 
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Occidentalism entails a reversal of roles: “The West becomes the Other, the Orient is 
restored to Self.” In that sense, for the non-Westerners, Occidentalism emerged as a tool 
of reversing the hegemony of the West, yet by using the same tools used by Westerners.  
2.3.1. Occidentalism: A Complex Concept of Modernity’s Impasse 
My contention is that Occidentalism neither corresponds to simply reversing 
Orientalism nor is it a blunt attack on Western values, at least not in the trajectory of 
Turkey’s modernization process. The way I employ the term encompasses a complex 
and sometimes contradictory “love-hate” relationship with the West. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Turkey’s modernization process was heavily influenced by Western values, 
which created a visible admiration for the West on the part of Turkish elites. However, 
this admiration was not pure; rather, it was blended with a certain amount of inferiority 
vis-à-vis the West and its values. The feeling of inferiority, however, might have been 
sometimes reflected as fear or, when the concept of modernity was borrowed from the 
West, it carried some of the Orientalist discourses and methods the West assumed in the 
same baggage.
12
  
The definition of the concept of Occidentalism as it is employed in this study is 
very much informed by Meltem Ahıska’s approach to the term. In her extensive analysis 
of Occidentalism in Turkey in her book Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of 
Modernity and Turkish Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting (2010), Ahıska explores 
how a historical overview of the development of Turkish radio broadcasting reveals the 
concomitant national culture construction. She finds that the discourse of the radio 
broadcasting tried to find a “pure national voice,” (Ahıska 2010: 83) while also 
attempting to eliminate anything that had the connotation of the ‘East,’ as shown in the 
example of how alla turca
13
 music was banned from the Turkish radio between 1934–
1936, because the Turkish elite felt that alla turca music represented “bad taste,” 
                                               
12
 The best example of that fear is embodied in what was coined as “Sévres Syndrome.” For a detailed discussion of 
that syndrome, see Göçek, Fatma Müge (2011). The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the 
Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era. London: I.B.Tauris or Bülent Aras, Sevres Syndrome.  
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 From the Italian alla turca meaning ‘Turkish style.’ 
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“primitivity,” and “being uncivilized.”14 More significantly, alla turca music was also 
associated with being eastern or Arab but certainly not Turkish, which not only helped 
construct a national identity but also demarcated itself from the so-called East (80). 
Ahıska illustrates that the motivation behind this approach was creating both a Western 
and a unique national style of broadcasting. In that sense, “the West is both within and 
without; it signifies the desire to be both same and different (27). 
 Ahıska (2010) also asserts that “Occidentalism is neither simply a desire to 
become Western nor a hostility against the West, but a much more complex power 
discourse and fantasy”15 (307). It is important here to note the word “power discourse,” 
because it underlines Occidentalism’s hegemonic nature, just like Orientalism’s. This 
power relation works on two layers. The first layer is the power relations with the West. 
In this formulation, Turkish elites do not simply mimic the West, but reconstruct its 
values in the process of its borrowing. The utilization of a power discourse consolidates 
the hegemony of the nation builders. The subject (the Self) and object (the Other) of that 
power discourse have played against each other in very different social and political 
instances in Turkish history. “Different people and segments of the society are 
categorized either as ‘national but not modern,’ or ‘modern but not national’ and cast as 
Others” (Ahıska 2010: 28). Meltem Ahıska further points out the consequences of 
Occidentalism within the society as follows: “The re-codification and operationalization 
of a notion of the West is also mobilized within power relations to demarcate, define, 
and control others within the society” (Ahıska 2010: 41). 
 It is through this framework of “demarcation and defining the Self and 
controlling others within the society” that I would like to discuss the cultural 
consequences of the Kurdish Question. As Ahıska herself also notes, I argue that the 
most subtle example of this power relation is the way in which the Kurdish Question is 
handled on the cultural level. As Ahıska also points out, the eastern regions where the 
Kurds predominantly live are translated into “an inner border that symbolically 
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 Emphasis mine.  
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separates the West of Turkey from the ‘backward’ East, contaminated by Arabic, 
Kurdish and other cultures” (Ahıska 2010: 15). In my estimation, while the Hamidiye 
troops, forced disappearances, and military interventions in the region constitute the 
political and military layers of this question, the discourses that the state developed and 
their reflections in the mainstream media, the cartoons or the daily talk about the Kurds 
constitute the cultural level. In this formulation, these two levels play a complementary 
role.  
2.4. The Kurds’ Place in Society: From the Ottoman Legacy to the Republic 
A glance into Turkish history could easily reveal the perennial Kurdish question, 
which carries its importance and its relics to date. The history of the Kurds in Turkey 
can be identified to be a ‘minority history’ in the same sense as historian known for his 
contributions to postcolonial theory and subaltern studies Dipesh Chakrabarty uses it. 
Chakrabarty problematizes ‘minority histories’ by stating that minority and majority 
histories are not natural entities, but constructs based on statistics. Interestingly enough, 
sometimes an ethnic group which actually constitutes the majority may be considered 
the minority (Chakrabarty 2000: 100). Given Chakrabarty’s insightful observation, 
Kurds in Turkey, and in other countries where they live, have a minority history, and yet 
in some parts they actually constitute the majority—especially in the regions people 
tend to call the ‘Eastern’ parts of Turkey. 
In this section, I will further analyze the way in which the provinces where 
Kurds constitute a vast majority have become the locus of “backwater” discourse. The 
concept of underdevelopment as a fact is one critical viewpoint, and its reflections on 
the cultural arena is another. Hence, the political background of the Kurdish Question 
will not be exhaustively delineated as it is beyond the confines of this study. Still, since 
it is essential to provide a framework of the politics in order to be able to base a 
discourse analysis upon it, I will present a brief history of the Kurds in Turkey.  
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The Kurdish community living in Turkey comprises around 13 million people 
according to a 2001 statistic (Karimova and Deverell 2001), which corresponds to over 
20 percent of Turkey’s population. The Kurdish population is concentrated in 11 
provinces of the southeast (Karimova and Deverell 2001). According to Mutlu (1996), 
Kurds constitute 70 percent of the population in the eastern and southeastern regions. 
The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, relegated only the non-Muslim community to a 
“minority status” in Turkey, thus disqualifying any Muslim ethnic minorities (Karimova 
and Deverell 2001). As a Muslim community, Kurds were not given an ethnic, 
linguistic, or national minority status. Usage of the Kurdish language is only allowed in 
non-political contexts
16
 (UNHCR 1997) or in an educational setting (Karimova and 
Deverell 2001).  
Thomas Eriksen (1993) classifies the Kurdish community as a proto-nation, 
which he defines as follows: “By definition, these groups have political leaders who 
claim they are entitled to their own nation-state and should not be ruled by others. As 
they don’t have a nation state, they are more likely to have more characteristics in 
common with nations than with urban minorities or indigenous people” (Eriksen 1993: 
19). He also adds that “[t]hey are always territorially based, they are differentiated 
according to class and educational achievement.” As a proto-nation, in Eriksen’s 
estimation, Kurds also claimed that they could be referred to as a “nation without 
nation-state” (Eriksen 1993: 19). Although there is no legal impediment in Kurds 
representing themselves in parliament, several attempts at representation by Kurds 
failed (Göle 2000), in a way, symbolically demonstrating the state’s ambivalence to 
having Kurds in leadership or representational roles. In 1984, however, Kurdish 
nationalism had started to express itself violently through its guerilla wars against the 
state through the armed group, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). These conflicts 
had resulted in at least 30,000 casualties until the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan (Yüksel 2006: 780. Moreover, the relations between the state and the southeast 
were aggravated following the rising conflict with the PKK (Karimova and Deverell 
2001; Sarıgil 2009). 
                                               
16
 UNHCR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ (Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and 
Research, 1997) 
  
27 
In terms of integrating Kurds in society, the Turkish state was willing to accept 
them as citizens, yet on the condition that they acknowledge the Turkish identity and 
give up their Kurdish identity. Those who complied become successful actors in society, 
while those who resisted and retained their identities become marginalized (Göçek 
2011: 153).  
2.4.1. Historical Roots of “Borrowed Orientalism” in the Ottoman Empire 
Post-colonialist scholars criticized some scholars studying the Third-World for 
just focusing on the colonizer and the colonized, leaving these two sides as binary 
opposites. They offer, instead, to expand the scope of Orientalism with the inclusion of 
such in-between places as the Ottoman Empire (Göçek 2013; Deringil 2003). Scholars 
like Ussama Makdisi, Selim Deringil, and Meltem Ahıska17 have attended to this 
lacuna, focusing on the complexities that emerge when the role Orientalism played is 
studied in the context of the Ottoman Empire, discovering some peculiar characteristics. 
In this section, I will try to turn to scholars with a post-colonial studies background to 
point out the analytical suggestions post-colonial studies offer. 
Fatma Müge Göçek argues that an analysis of Ottoman history, together with the 
histories of the Persian, Russian and Austria-Hungarian Empires, could productively 
inform traditional post-colonial theory because of its “negotiated modernity,” which she 
defines as an intention of generating knowledge that is not influenced by Western 
knowledge (Göçek 2013). The Ottoman Empire offers particularly productive 
information because it was a political power both in pre-modern and modern times. 
Moreover, its geographic reach encompassed the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Middle 
East. Hence, the Ottoman Empire does not easily fit into the binary oppositions that 
scholars so far chose to examine. Thereby, she aims to disturb the neatly divided 
boundaries of the colonizer and the colonized (Göçek 2013). 
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Examining the rising superiority of Europe vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, Selim 
Deringil (2003) suggests an analysis of Ottoman modernization on the model of the 
West both from a reactionary perspective and from an internalization perspective on the 
part of the Ottoman Empire. He argues that Ottoman elites brought the concepts of 
modernity and colonialism together in their attempt to survive. Deringil calls this 
conflation “borrowed colonialism.” According to Deringil’s insightful argument, the 
Ottoman elite adopted a similar colonialist attitude towards its own peripheries in the 
nineteenth century and treated those provincial places as colonial settings (Deringil 
2003). 
On the other hand, Ussama Makdisi analyzes the relationship between 
Orientalism and the Ottoman Empire in dialogue with Deringil’s concept of “Borrowed 
Colonialism.” Having observed a similar complexity in Ottoman attitudes towards its 
own periphery, Makdisi contends that in the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire 
positioned the West as the locus of progress, and the East as that of backwardness. 
However, the scene was not as simple as that. The empire claimed agency and 
originality through Islamic practice. Together with that claim of agency, the empire also 
created a pre-modern within itself, from which it strived to distinguish itself as much as 
possible. To do so, the empire embarked on disciplinary and orientalizing attitudes 
towards its eastern peripheries that bore similar traits to that of the European powers. In 
this sense, Ottoman Orientalism was a “defining facet of Ottoman modernity” (Makdisi 
2002: 769). 
Deringil (2003) and Makdisi (2009) have argued that a paradigm shift occurred 
in the eighteenth century in the way Ottoman elites conceived its periphery. While the 
former calls it ‘borrowed Orientalism’ and the latter ‘Ottoman Orientalism,’ these 
scholars agree on the ideology’s close interaction with rising European colonialism. 
Deringil (2003) also argues that the Ottomans’ borrowed colonialism developed side-
by-side with nationalism (314). As a result, it is evident that in Ottoman Orientalism the 
predominant figure was Europe—the locus of modernism and development. Bringing it 
together with Said’s observation about the distinction between Orientalists’ approach to 
their colonies and that of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Empire’s Orientalist 
tendencies gain more significance. Said puts this distinction as follows: “The point is 
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that the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced 
evaluative judgment, and in the case of the people’s inhabiting the decayed Ottoman 
Empire, an implicit program of action” (Said 1978: 207). 
2.4.2. Kurds in Contemporary Turkey 
What does ‘Eastern’ denote within the borders of Turkey? Why are the eastern 
parts of the Black Sea region not considered to be ‘Eastern,’ but the parts populated 
mostly by Kurds are? Where is the ‘East’ in Turkey? The ‘East’ in question is as elusive 
as the term ‘the Middle East’ (Davison 1959-1960). When the Kurdish question is 
placed side-by-side with the popular nebulous conception of the ‘Eastern’ part of 
Turkey in comparison to the rest of Turkey—be it the de jure capital, Ankara, or the de 
facto capital Istanbul, or a provincial part of Turkey (as if it does not require a 
characterization other than being the most ‘backward’ part of the country)–it seems 
there are significant similarities between the way the Turkish state ideology approached 
the Kurds and how British colonialists in Egypt approached the native Egyptian 
population.  
This question about what eastern denotes gains more importance when we 
connect it with Ahıska’s assessment of Occidentalism as the way the West figures in the 
temporal/spatial imagining of modern Turkish national identity (Ahıska 2003: 354). 
Given Deringil and Makdisi’s findings which demonstrate that the Ottomans’ 
representation of their own periphery was informed by Western Orientalism and 
Western values, I argue that Orientalism and Occidentalism appeared as flip sides of the 
same coin. That is, the West was always figuring in the way the center was imagining 
its own periphery. Hence, the conflation of Occidentalism and Orientalism needs to take 
into account the specific complexities of Turkish Orientalist ideology in reference to its 
treatment of the Kurdish population.  
Testifying to Deringil and Makdisi’s arguments regarding the Ottoman Empire, 
one of the characteristics attributed to ‘Eastern’ Turkey is ‘backwardness’ in relation to 
contemporary Turkish society. On the cultural level, Turks who constitute the Other for 
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Westerners invented their own “barbarian” status, which shifted from being Muslim 
(according to the West), to being Kurdish (according to Turkish Orientalism). First as 
Muslim, then as Kurds. These two groups have been presented as impediments to 
Turkey’s modernization. (Göle 2000: 66). Turkish Orientalism attributed the image of 
being a “barbarian”, “vulgar”18, and “backward” to its Kurdish population. During this 
process of invention, or “fantasy” in Ahıska’s words, the eastern regions have emerged 
as the pseudonym and the locus of Kurdish backwardness. When explaining this, 
Timothy Mitchell’s argument that modernity has always been associated with a certain 
place and time is useful. In many uses the modern is just a synonym for the West 
(Mitchell 2000). In such a conception, one part is always temporarily and spatially more 
advanced, leaving the other doomed to backwardness. Similarly, as Makdisi points out, 
in the perspective of Ottoman Orientalism, the people living in the peripheries such as 
Mount Lebanon were regarded as “backward” (Makdisi 2002: 770). Demonstrating a 
continuous pattern, the way the regions where the Kurds populate emerge in the popular 
imaginary is an equation with backwardness in contemporary Turkey that remained as a 
vestigate of the empire into the modern day construction of the Turkish republic.  
The second characteristic of Ottoman Orientalism was to regard the populations 
in its periphery (periphery as referring to the eastern side in Makdisi’s examination) as 
‘not-yet-Ottoman’ (Makdisi 2002: 770). This observation becomes much more 
meaningful when it is brought together with Mesut Yeğen’s argument about 
contemporary Turkey that Kurds have been regarded either as “Prospective-Turks’/’to-
be-Turks” or “Pseudo- Citizens” (Yeğen 2009; Üngör 2008). Yeğen has argued that the 
prospective-Turk image became a ‘meta-image’ during the republican period, although 
it does not follow a stable route. Even though Yeğen’s assessment does not go further 
and give a longer history of the Kurds under Ottoman rule, the observation that Kurds 
were considered to be ‘to-be-Turks’ overlaps with Makdisi’s ‘to-be-Ottomans’ 
evaluation in a way that supports the persistence of an Orientalist discourse in the 
republican period too.  
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There are also other moments when ‘eastern’ Anatolia has been treated with an 
Orientalist ideology. Yeğen (2009), among others, argues that the Turkish state 
embarked on a comprehensive program of assimilation with the techniques of 
increasing state-sponsored education, improving transportation facilities, and 
conducting censuses (600). Those apparatuses are all techniques Mitchell also brings 
attention to in his book Colonizing Egypt (1988) in which he discusses the colonization 
of Egypt. It is worth noting that what those techniques imply is the backwardness and 
underdeveloped character of the region in question, which has legitimized reckless state 
interventions that do not take the unique regional dynamics into account.  
There are also other techniques such as the compulsory resettlement of Kurds in 
the West and Turks in the East with the motive of creating more homogeneously 
Turkish/Turkified citizens (Yeğen 2009; Yükseker 2005). What an overall assessment 
of the aforementioned techniques implemented in the mission of Turkification imply is 
the nationalist motive embedded in the Turkish Orientalism.  
2.5. Occidentalism: Europe Re-enters the Scene 
Although a more contextualized discussion of the 1990s will be provided in the 
following chapter, I would like to exemplify the employment of Occidentalism in the 
1990s with regard to the resettlements of Kurds. Towards the end of the 1990s, one date 
played a role as a catalyst with regard to the forced displacements and the social 
problems related to it. In 1999, Turkey was granted candidacy status for EU accession 
on the condition that Turkey meets the Copenhagen Criteria for the accession 
negotiations to begin. This date was a milestone in terms of the state discourse with 
regard to the forced displacements and to the Kurdish Question. Only after this date did 
the post-displacement problems begin to be considered a priority of foreign policy 
(Ayata and Yükseker 2005). The improvement in Turkey-European Union (EU) 
relations brought about an improvement in the non-Muslims’ status (Çağaptay 2006: 
163). Turkey’s zeal of satisfying EU’s accession rules resulted in a transformation of the 
state’ position from complete denial to regulation in terms of the consequences of this 
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internal displacement, because now the displacements were under the watch of an 
international audience so much so that the internal displacement problem was going to 
be included in the European Commission’s annual progress reports in 2002. However, 
the displacement problem was still being treated under the umbrella of regional 
development in the arena of internal politics.  
What makes this development relevant to the discussions in this thesis is the fact 
that the entrance of the European “gaze” changed the way the Turkish state approaches 
its domestic situation. While the state’s first reaction was to deny its responsibility for 
these displacements, in the cases that were taken to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Turkey was sentenced to pay compensation to the plaintiffs, beginning with 
cases dating back to 1996. Still, none of the governments accepted that the officials had 
complicity in the forced displacement (Ayata and Yükseker 2005: 17). Within this 
context, when there is an incentive presented by Europe, the locus of modernity, to 
become part of it, the ambivalent stance of the state tends to change its position towards 
the Kurdish Question. Only when EU membership becomes a foreign policy priority 
and a tenable objective the state agree to take steps towards tackling post-displacement 
problems (Ayata and Yükseker 2005: 32). Considering the discussion and analysis 
above, it is not hard to arrive at the opinion that the Kurdish Issue is addressed in a more 
proper way when it gains the potential of changing something for the western “gaze,” 
exemplifying the role of Occidentalism. However, to what extent this willingness is 
genuine and would be put into practice, is still open for discussion. 
 
2.6. The Center-Periphery Cleavage  
In the prism of the above-mentioned descriptions, an important question arises: 
What makes the Kurdish case special in relation to other ethnic or religious groups, like 
the Alevis, Circassians or Armenians in the country with regard to Kemalist policies? At 
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first glance, it can well be argued that there are many groups that could not or did not 
want to come to terms with Kemalist ideology and its policies, considering its 
decreasing appeal for various groups starting from the 1950s. Were the Kurds the only 
group for whom Kemalism was not appealing, or who were affected by Kemalist 
policies? I believe that the answer to this question lies in the social composition of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. In order to answer that question, I would 
like to consult Şerif Mardin’s seminal theory of “center and periphery,” for a discussion 
of Orientalism in the context of Ottoman and Turkish politics is similar to that of the 
center-periphery paradigm in the sense that the center assumes a superiority vis-à-vis its 
periphery.  
Mardin worked extensively on the trajectory of modernism in Turkey. He 
approached the Turkish concept of modernity as a transformation of Ottoman society to 
the Turkish republic and claimed that this transformation had substantial consequences 
for present-day Turkish society. In a similar vein, he observed a societal divide which 
dates back to Ottoman history and society: the “center-periphery” cleavage, which has 
been a seminal terminology in understanding current Turkish society because it has 
endured in the republican period, although it has not been preserved in its entirety. 
Center, in Mardin’s own words, “stands for the core of legitimacy that enables the 
Ottoman state to function as well as for the central bureaucratic apparatus that kept the 
state functioning. Periphery refers to the residual social arena—the institutions and the 
geographical area that lived apart from the center and were only in loose integration 
with it” (Mardin 2006). 
In his discussion of the historicity of the center and periphery cleavage in the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, Mardin argues that while the integration or 
separation of the non-Muslim elements in the empire has been extensively addressed, 
the complications that emerged out of the integration of non-Muslim groups were 
undermined. However, the latter posed as many—if not more—challenges as the 
integration of non-Muslims within the nation-state (Mardin 2006). Although the Young 
Turks enforced unification in the regions where the cleavage was more visible through 
educational and cultural unification, their efforts proved to be inefficient to gather the 
support they expected.  
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 Mardin states that there was a demarcation between officials and the masses in 
the Ottoman Empire, including the urban and rural masses simultaneously. This was 
highlighted in the bureaucratic core of the state. What he refers to by the “bureaucratic 
core of the society” is the control of the economy. A very symbolic example of this 
domination of the economy is the restrictions on property ownership, which assigns the 
Sultan as owner of the all the arable lands, and on sumptuary regulations. The state’s 
claim to control society was symbolically conveyed by the “cultural preeminence” of 
the elites. Mardin holds that, as a result of this mechanism of cultural segmentation, “the 
periphery developed its own extremely varied counter-culture, but it was well aware of 
its secondary cultural status (2006). He also argues that the elites maintained their 
superior position with the help of certain “symbolic differences.” Although the form or 
content of these symbolic differences is not relevant to the present discussion, the 
evaluation supports the discussions of Orientalism/Occidentalism (Mardin 1973: 171). 
Mardin states that that these policies were adopted, by and large, by the 
Kemalists in the earliest stages of organizing the national independence movement, 
though Kemalists sought integration and homogenization in the society. Yet, because of 
the discrepancy between discourse and reality, the social structure was preserved to a 
great extent (Karaömerlioğlu 2006: 75), which created its own problems due to the 
ambivalent stance arising from it. Among the representational organizations of the 
independence movement is a party which represents the periphery. According to 
Mardin, “The symbolic expression of the Kemalists’” opposition to the Second Group 
and to provincials focused on religion” (Mardin 2006: 310). He also points out that 
when “this opposition party was formed whose activities almost coincided with a 
Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed, giving the 
government wide powers for two years” (Mardin 2006: 310). The quote, I believe, 
illustrates an instance when intolerance towards the periphery and Kurds come to the 
surface in a way that shows the relation between them.  
Mardin further argues that the coup d’état, a revolution in Mardin’s words, 
underlines the cleavage between the center, “now identified with the preservation of a 
static order, and the periphery, the real “party of movement” (Mardin 2006: 314). 
Mardin finally asserts that “two facets of the peripheral code seem to have emerged with 
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clearer outlines during modernization: the periphery as made up of primordial groups, 
and the periphery as the center of a counter-official culture. Both were Bêtes noires of 
the Young Turks and the Kemalists. But the policies of the modernizers, as along with 
fortuitous developments, worked to highlight the second facet of peripheral identity” 
(Mardin 2006: 315). I believe that in this quote, once again, Kurds are implied by 
“primordial groups.” In that description, too, the official counter-culture is preferred 
over the primordial group and the former group is highlighted in a way that supports the 
above-mentioned negligence of the state elites regarding Kurds. Mardin concludes 
suggesting that “rumbling concerning Kurdish attempts at separate organization [has] 
been heard for some time. There is evidence both of new cleavages and of 
differentiation within periphery” (Mardin 2006: 315). In retrospect, I believe, a kind of 
resolution took place in terms of the composition of the cleavage in Turkey rather than 
differentiation within the periphery, considering the central role the Kurdish Question 
plays in Turkish politics. In that sense, the periphery comes to occupy the center, 
suggesting its long forgotten “subjectivity.” 
 
2.7. Self-Orientalism 
The Orientalist tendencies of the state inevitably left its mark on the Kurds. As a 
term that was used by many scholars,
19
 Self-Orientalism is a possible consequence of 
the above-discussed concepts of Orientalism and Occidentalism. Yusuf Çiftçi (2013) 
adopts this term in his book Self Oryantalizm ve Türkiye’de Kürtler [Self-Orientalism 
and the Kurds in Turkey], which examines the case of the Kurds in Turkey from the 
perspective of that concept. He defines that concept as a distorted representation of 
one’s own culture and identity by trying to explain it vis-à-vis Western values and 
according to the West (Çiftçi 2013: 29). Çiftçi looks at how self-Orientalism renders a 
culture or a state-ideology both as an agent and subject at the same time by examining 
both pre-modern and post-modern times. He also discusses how Self-Orientalism 
creates interaction in a similar way that Bayart draws attention to “carrier elites” (Bayart 
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2011). In terms of spheres of interaction, Çiftçi also looks at education, trade, exile, etc. 
I argue that such an extended understanding as Çiftçi’s, which encompasses both the 
advantages and the disadvantages of Turkish Orientalism, is more promising when one 
tries to understand the complexities at issue in the Kurdish case in Turkey. Although the 
Turkish state’s ideology is informed by Western Colonialist and Orientalist perspective, 
the relationship between Kurds and the state cannot be reduced to the binary opposites 
of “colonizer” and “colonized.” What I mean by this is that although Turkey’s handling 
of the Kurdish Question is very much influenced by the Orientalists’ approach, both the 
state and the Kurds have been influenced by each other. Demarcation played an 
important role in the state’s construction of the Turkish identity. However, rather than 
designating a one-way construction of Turkish identity, I suggest that Turkish identity 
was created within/through the complexities and ambivalences that emerged in this 
process.  
 
2.8. Evaluations and Conclusion 
The specific consequences of the center and periphery cleavage have been 
studied by Laçiner (2005) and Göle (1999). Ömer Laçiner questions the specificity of 
that cleavage in the Turkish case and claims that the relations between center and 
periphery are common among different societies. In Turkey this relation is highly 
charged with tensions, with a high tone of hierarchy. In this sense, periphery in Turkey 
refers to something beyond the provinces that are politically dependent on the center 
(Laçiner 2005: 14-15), which he traces back to the Ottoman Empire. He conceptualizes 
this significant gap in the context of the ambition of the center to catch up with the 
rising power of the West and its attempt to come to terms with the challenges imposed 
by the West. In this context, while the western provinces were supportive of the center 
in its struggle to catch up with Western values and modernity, the Muslim population in 
the eastern provinces approached these developments with a certain reservation due to 
the reforms giving equal status to the minorities of the empire. Moreover, the warrantors 
of this equal status were “the Great powers” (Laçiner 2005: 16). When this reservation 
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came together with the socio-economic structure which cannot be easily integrated with 
this modern project and its ethnic composition, the eastern and southeastern provinces 
emerged as a double-periphery (Ibid 2005).  
In light of the above-mentioned discussion, it is inevitable to argue that the 
Kurdish question should not be simply reduced to a national movement. Combination of 
dynamics such as Turkey’s ambition for Western style modernism, its adoption of 
Orientalist methods, and its ambivalent reaction towards the hegemony of the West 
seems to have played an important role in the way the state formed its relationship with 
the Kurds. On the other hand, the Kurds seem to have developed their own way of 
reacting to handling this dynamic in the form of insurgency, the internalization of the 
values attributed to them as well as forming a new identity vis-à-vis the state.  
Finally, I want to note that although I believe that Orientalism/Occidentalism, 
Center/Periphery are useful and underestimated concepts to understand the Kurdish 
question, I do not intend to suggest that this question can be reduced to these binaries. I 
believe that they are, however, effective tools to understand the power mechanism at 
play. In order to deconstruct these power mechanisms, one should keep an eye on seeing 
possible fissures that do not fit into these paradigms, in order not to fall into the trap of 
seeing the world in black and white. Last but not least, as I will try to argue more in 
detail in the following chapters, starting with the 1990s, the Kurdish Question also 
seems to have undergone a transition both in terms of what it is and how it is considered 
by the state elites in a way that suggests the kind of fissures I mentioned above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
KEMALIST FEMINISM AND THE KURDISH WOMEN 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to explore how Kemalist women were envisioned by the 
Kemalist ideology as the “marker of the nation’s modernity,” which resulted in creating 
a group that is disintegrated from their Kurdish/eastern counterparts. This analysis will 
serve as the basis for the argument that Kurdish women have a twofold minority status 
as a group at the crossroads of these two “minority” categories; on the one hand, they 
were striped of their ethnic identity, and on the other, the fact that their Turkish 
counterparts in other regions could benefit from the Kemalist reforms aiming to 
improve the civic and potential status of women to a much greater extent, created a 
wide gap between Kurdish and Turkish Kemalist women (Yüksel 778).  
On the other hand, this chapter will try to understand the formation of a distinct 
profile of the Kemalist “ideal woman” who is “in charge of” guarding Kemalist 
understanding of modernity and how this image of “ideal woman” serves, in turn, to the 
Kemalist ideology. In order to do that, it will consult the feminist literature on the 
Kemalist reforms targeting women. Considering that Kemalist women have a distinct 
identification with the Kemalist reforms and republican values, and that Kemalism 
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always took pride in its role in improvement of women’s rights in Turkey, the 
formation process of this mutual relationship between Kemalist ideology and will be 
analyzed from the perspective of feminist literature in order to understand its strengths 
and weaknesses. 
As a result, the relationship between the state’s discourse and Kurdish women will 
be delineated to contextualize the discussion of Orientalism and Occidentalism 
presented in Chapter 2. In the first section of this chapter, I will investigate the history 
of the policies addressing women to situate the Kemalist project’s “developmentalist” 
attitude toward, and in theconstruction of, the country’s “East.” A literature review of 
the critical reception of these policies by feminist scholars and a discussion of their 
impact on society, with particular emphasis on Kurdish women, follows. The second 
part of this chapter briefly analyzes Dağ Çiçeklerim [My Mountain Flowers], a 
posthumously published memoir by Sıdıka Avar, who worked as a teacher between 
1939-1959 in various towns in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. These 
towns were, and still are, places where Kurds form the majority of the population. 
Examining Avar’s memoir as a case is significant, especially due to the author’s claim 
that she was sent to these villages as a “Turkish missionary” upon Atatürk’s personal 
behest. 
3.1.1. The Role Attributed to Women by the Nationalist Project 
Turkey is among the few countries that addressed the question of women’s 
emancipation quite early, extensively, and explicitly. Steps taken to improve the status 
of women in Turkish Republic had almost always overlapped with the reforms to 
modernize the country. Hence, the Kemalist Revolution marked the peak of the process 
of Westernization for many pro-regime intellectuals (Azak 2010: 10). An example of 
this overlap is the Law of the Unification of Education in 1924, which was enacted on 
the same day with the abolishment of the Caliphate (Ibid: 10). The enactment of the 
Swiss Civil Code in 1926 within the first ten years following the official declaration of 
the republic gave political and civil rights to women that would change their social 
status, as with that new civil law their equality was recognized in law. It also outlawed 
polygamy and granted equal rights in demanding divorce to both women and men. In 
  
40 
the following years, reforms continued. Women in the Turkish Republic gained 
suffrage in 1934; earlier than women in many European countries.  
Turkish republican policies addressing women took such a central place that 
they became one of the essential elements of the Republic of Turkey (Saktanber 2001). 
These reforms served the Kemalist ideology in various ways. In the first place, they 
served to establish a new image of being a part of the civilized Western world (Azak 
2010: 11). That is, the fact that Kemalist reforms addressing women were put into 
practice marked that Turkey’s place within the Western countries became a source of 
pride for Kemalists. Second, it created a group of “grateful” Kemalist women who were 
‘granted’ rights (ostensibly without a fight). Atatürk envisaged the acknowledgment of 
women’s rights “as a requirement for the establishment of democracy” (quoted in Arat 
1998: 87). In this sense, Atatürk acknowledged women’s rights insofar as they 
overlapped with the tenets of democratization. However, particularly the women who 
witnessed the formation period of the republic were grateful to Atatürk regardless of the 
problems that might arise from the limitations of this vision. One of these women who 
benefited from the Kemalist reforms, Hamide Topçuoğlu, became a leading sociologist 
of law, and expressed her gratitude to the republic as follows: “We conceptualized 
having a profession differently. Having a profession was not only earning our living. It 
was being of service to something, being successful. We will work even if we are fed 
by someone else. We will prove ourselves by our profession. Atatürk emancipated 
women by giving them an assignment” (quoted in Arat 1998: 88).20 As Topçuoğlu’s 
statement demonstrates, women who benefited from the reforms internalized the role of 
serving the modernization of the country and took pride in doing so. They actually grew 
a “platonic love [for the state]” (quoted in Özyürek 2008: 32), which lead Kemalist 
women to organize in non-governmental organization in the 1990s. Secondly, they 
perceived themselves to be the representatives of “Turkish women.” These roles are 
best exemplified by women who support the CHP, which will be the basis of the 
analysis in Chapter 4.  
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This character of the reforms, however, cannot be restricted to the case of 
Turkey. On the contrary, the “emancipation of women” signified much wider political 
and social steps towards modernity; many revolutionary and decolonizing projects, such 
as India and Yemen as well as in Turkey (Kandiyoti 1991). In many nationalist and 
modernizing projects, nation and gender are informed and constructed by each other, 
where women symbolize both the biological and cultural reproduction of the nation 
(Yuval-Davis 1997: 61). In the Turkish case, similarly, the biological and cultural 
reproduction of the nation, including its modern values, were invested upon the “ideal” 
Kemalist women.  
 
3.1.2. Critical Reception of Kemalist Reforms: Symbolic Role of Women 
According to sociologist Deniz Kandiyoti (1987), one noteworthy characteristic 
of the reforms is that “these rights were not obtained through the activities of women’s 
movements, as in the case of Western women’s struggle for suffrage, but were granted 
by an enlightened governing elite committed to the goals of modernization and 
‘Westernization’” (320). Yet, that women in Turkey did not personally struggle for 
their rights, as Kandiyoti once argued, is today not a commonly shared assessment. 
Şirin Tekeli contends that there was an active feminist movement between 1910 and 
1920 in the Ottoman Empire, which she calls the first wave of feminism. Tekeli argues 
that the feminist women of this time were in fact very active in terms of their personal 
impacts on the role of women in society, particularly in their attempt to be an active 
part of the modernization process (Tekeli 1998). That women founded the first political 
party of the republic in 1921, namely Kadınlar Halk Fırkası (People’s Party of Women), 
is testament to the extent of women’s political agency during this time. This party was 
later transformed to an organization called Türk Kadın Birliği (Turkish Women 
Association) in 1924. However, this association was closed down in 1935 because it 
was considered to be “footloose” and “against national interests” by the government 
(Baykan and Ötüş-Baskett 1999). Overlooking, ignoring, or rejecting feminist 
movements in the Ottoman Empire served the founders of the Kemalist ideology, 
because constructing a history that was not democratic and “backward” made it easier 
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for them to champion their reforms more strongly. It was in fact an agenda geared 
towards thrusting the Kemalist reforms to the forefront. These very reforms made it 
possible for Kemalists and the state to take pride in being “modern,” because women’s 
rights were being developed and championed, and thus, the state was considered more 
modern and Western. By a simple symbolic gesture, Kemalists were equipped with a 
very effective instrument that could convey the very messages they wanted.  
Although the close relationship between Turkish nationalism, modernism, and 
women’s rights is a highly applauded theme in official discourse, it does not go 
uncontested. Many scholars, including Fatmagül Berktay, Ayşe Durakpaşa, Zehra F. 
Arat, Şirin Tekeli, Meyda Yeğenoğlu, and Ayşe Kadıoğlu have critically approached 
the effectiveness and quality of the Kemalist reforms on women’s rights and 
emancipation. While some of them acknowledge the success of the reforms, others 
approach it from a more critical perspective. The critics contend that the Turkish 
republic’s interest in women’s rights was not driven solely by the motivation to 
emancipate women. Rather, these reforms were inextricably related to the motivation to 
modernize.  
Among the group of scholars critical of the emancipation discourse of Turkish 
reforms, the symbolic employment of the image of women stands out as a shared theme 
in their works. While attributing importance to the question of women’s rights as part of 
the project of founding a secular, modern, and nationalist republic, women became the 
emblem of political agendas in a way that risked the effectiveness of the reforms. 
Kandiyoti explains another facet of the motivation behind the aforementioned 
enthusiastic embrace of feminist policies, arguing alongside Peter Molyneux's assertion 
that “the policies geared towards women “may be seen a key to dismantling the old 
order” (in Kandiyoti 1987: 321). Molyneux’s line of thought also bears witness to the 
Turkish case. In fact, Kemalists fervently sought to break the country’s ties with its 
Ottoman past, employing women’s emancipation as one of its main initiatives, 
especially in the earliest years of the republic, which presents a further 
instrumentalization of women’s bodies and political subjectivities by writing them and 
thus implicating them specifically into the national project.  
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Concurring with Kandiyoti’s argument, Nilüfer Göle taps into the emblematic 
role women played in the Turkish modernization project. She states that the republic 
gave public visibility to women (Göle 2004: 100) and women, in return, served the 
republic as the “new face” of its Westernization task. Göle goes on to suggest that the 
choice of the image of women is a subtle way of bringing visibility to an ideology, as it 
combines the symbols of being secular as opposed to being religious, progressive as 
opposed to “modern,” and European as opposed to Middle Eastern. Depending on to 
what extent women are secular, “modern,” or “western,” the messages of modernness 
and westernness are conveyed; indeed a very critical part of constructing the Turkish 
identity. In this sense, women stood at the crossroads of many powerful ideologies. In 
other words, the semiotics of women conveyed the messages of the state’s forming 
ideologies.  
One question that justifiably arises is whether the emblematic handling of 
women in the creation of the secular Turkish Republic was unique to the Turkish case. 
Berktay and Kandiyoti contend that this method is far from being unique, and can also 
be observed in other Middle Eastern countries (Berktay 1998: 3; Kandiyoti 1987). An 
interesting characteristic about the emblematic role of women is the messages it 
conveys and then, the ways in which these messages are subsequently portrayed. In the 
Kemalist discourse carefully sculpted by the state, the image of the ideal Turkish 
woman did not exactly conform to the Western model. In contrast to the modern 
Western woman who was encouraged to leave the domestic sphere and enter the 
workspace, the modern Turkish woman should be “domestic” and “compassionate,” but 
most of all, “chaste/modest”21 (Kadıoğlu 1998). While dress codes became westernized 
and women’s public visibility rose, women conveyed the message of being modern in a 
way that underscored a desire to be Western and their fear of being “alla Turca,” while 
at the same time constructing a particular brand of the modern woman that differed 
from their Western counterpart.  
                                               
21
 In the original text, this distinctive character of women is defined as “iffetli” whose exact meaning neither 
“modest” nor “chaste” conveys. “Iffet” rather refers to the virtue coming from being chaste. It also has the 
connotations of “de-sexuality” of women. I think, it is also charged with the representational role of women with 
regard to the family honor.  
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Finally, Ayşe Saktanber (2001) finds in her extensive analysis of the Kemalist 
discourse on women’s rights that Kemalist reforms prioritized the achievement of 
women and men equally. Some examples that she presents include the way in which 
women from higher socio-economic circles had access to education and could be hired 
for prestigious jobs. However, women were still excluded from many decision-making 
positions, especially in public administration (Saktanber 2001). Hence, some of these 
reforms remained on the legal level and were not felt by some others in their daily lives. 
She also notes that this attitude towards women’s rights were not only adhered to in the 
formative years of the republic, but were inherited by the policy makers who followed 
them in the 1950s and 1960s when Kemalists were not in control of the government. 
Some other very important reforms, on the other hand, were not in place until very 
recently. An example to them is the fact that women could gain the right to work 
without needing permission from their husbands only in the 1990s. They began to be 
employed in higher public positions only with the necessary amendments to the law.  
Fatmagül Berktay most convincingly argues one of the greatest deficiencies of 
the Kemalist ideology regarding women’s emancipation. Analyzing the semiotics of the 
Kemalist discourse, Berktay observes the way in which women emerge in its 
depictions. The leading nationalist and modernist men, instead of giving agency to 
women as political subjects, made use of women as a symbol in the dissemination of 
their ideology, rendering them the “object[s]” of these reforms rather than their 
“subject[s]” (Berktay 1998). As a result, the plausibility that these reforms were 
“emancipatory” is unlikely. 
3.1.3. Double Marginalization: The Case of Kurdish Women 
One of the commonly shared evaluations of many scholars is that women with 
urban bourgeois backgrounds stood out as those who benefited most from Kemalist 
reforms. On the one hand, there is a discrepancy between rural women and urban 
women, and on the other, between women in eastern and western Turkey. In this 
section, I will attempt to trace the political and cultural roots of these discrepancies, 
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focusing on the issue of the “backwardness” of eastern Turkey. I should note here that 
in the studies conducted up until the 2000s, the differences between the urban and rural 
regions of Turkey are studied to some extent, although analysis remains far from 
exhaustive. However, when talking about “eastern Turkey,” more often than not the 
Kurds are implied. This fact remains to be ignored by scholars. The presence of Kurds 
in the eastern and southeastern regions is merely circumvented through the word 
“ethnic” difference, and is never openly discussed.22 
Among the few scholars who focus on the conditions of eastern women, Yakın 
Ertürk’s research can be helpful in understanding another facet of “backwardness” of 
the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. In her examination of the modernization 
of eastern Turkey and rural women, Ertürk (1990) argues that in republican Turkey, the 
question of women was approached within the framework of the rights had been given 
to women by Atatürk’s reforms. However, Kemalists have not profoundly questioned to 
what extent women could exercise these rights, which women could specifically benefit 
from them, and why. While the state and Kemalists have not not question the 
applicability of these reforms in different parts of the country, or for women with 
different experiences of womanhood, they have preferred to approach it solely from a 
reformist approach. In her examination of the “modern family” as a new regulatory 
discourse, Kandiyoti (1997) presents an insightful theory about the discourse of 
“underdevelopment.” She states that, as with any other regulatory discourse, the ideal of 
the modern bourgeois family requires an Other that needs to be civilized. In a similar 
vein, normalizing certain articulations of sexuality and gender is based on the criticism 
and stigmatization of this Other. She further argues that modernizers can thus shape the 
image of their modern family by contrasting it to their Others, who are considered to be 
in need of reforms a priori (Kandiyoti 1997: 103). Another character of modernizers is 
overlooking the question of whether these structures they stigmatize exist in their own 
societies. The same process of othering and stigmatizing seems to have taken place in 
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 This analysis is based particularly on two compilations on women in Turkey. The first is “Women and Men in 75 
years” [75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler], which is a book that critically approaches to the republican women policies in 
the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The second is “Women in Turkey in the 1980s from the Perspective of 
Women” [1980’ler Türkiyesi’nde Kadın Bakış Açısından Kadınlar.” There are 26 articles in the former volume by 
leading feminist academicians. In the second volume, there are 19 articles. Among these scholars, only Yakın Ertürk 
pointed out the lack of a substantial examination of the eastern women’s position in the studies on the share of rural 
women’s workforce.  
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the form of the “underdeveloped” eastern women. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
Kurds/easterners were constructed as the Other of the Turkish identity. Similarly, the 
urban elite women of the republican period, who benefited from the Kemalist reforms, 
perceived their Kurdish counterparts as “underdeveloped,” because they needed, to 
borrow Makdisi’s term, their own “proving grounds” for their own modern status.  
It is probably this urge of creating homogeneity that justified the “top-down” 
nature of the implementation of the reforms, which constitutes one of the major 
problems of this ideology in and of itself. As are all experiences, women’s experiences 
are far from being homogeneous, just as the conditions in different regions are different 
due to their own particular structural elements. In a similar way, Ertürk states that 
“when we are talking about the modernization of eastern Turkey, we inevitably talk 
about the integration of the eastern region with the market economy. Yet, this process 
entails the reproduction of traditional structures against a particular socio-economic 
backdrop. In this sense, it is far from being a “technical process” unlike the 
expectations of the state. In my estimation, what Ertürk refers to as the “technical 
process” is the state’s expectation that once the reforms are in place, they should apply 
to the region in the expected way. However, when the traditional structure conflicts 
with the state-designed structure, the success of the reforms become endangered. Ertürk 
portrays women in the eastern parts as follows:  
Most women over 30 years old in the region do not speak Turkish, and 
most of them get married through Islamic religious marriage [religious 
ceremony] and can claim neither inheritance nor their children in the face 
of modern/secular laws. Many do not even "officially" exist because they 
are not even registered in the centralized population system. These 
women are becoming increasingly marginalized as a result of the process 
of national integration or modernization, and fall into a category of 
defenseless targets against the new institutions and mechanisms brought 
on by the state. In this case it is only possible to sustain their assets vis-à-
vis local power relations. Thus, the dependence of women on men in the 
East and men on other men (like the Ağa, Şıh, tribal reign) is consolidated 
by a/the modern/secular structure.
23
 (Ertürk 1990: 180) 
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 Translation mine. 
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This quotation very clearly demonstrates the clash referred to above. The traditional 
structures are the practices such as an “imam nikahı” [Islamic religious marriage] and 
the reality that in this region people speak Kurdish. However, the state rejects the 
latter’s reality. In the case of imam marriage, we can say that the state approaches it 
with toleration despite it being unofficial. However, the approach that creates reforms 
without looking at the consequences, results in marginalizing women; unless these 
hegemonic structures are acknowledged, the problems they create cannot be resolved. 
More importantly, not acknowledging these structures can lead to the reproduction 
and/or consolidation them, although they are intended to be removed from society. 
Ertürk further evaluates the consequences of this clash between reality and the law in 
the following way:  
The consequences of changes in power relations and in the legal/cultural 
scene for the daily struggles of women have not yet been systematically 
examined. In this respect, the process of economic/political integration 
creates very contradictory situations in the East, particularly for women 
living in Kurdish villages, depriving them of their traditional forces by 
pushing them into struggles they are unfamiliar at time
24
 (Ertürk 1990: 
180). 
What Ertürk refers to by the “traditional forces of women” entails complementarity of 
the division of labor between women and men, especially in the rural settings. Based on 
her research on eastern women, Ertürk argues that women gain a distinct power through 
the complementarity of the tasks they perform in the rural context. However, an 
evaluation of rural development projects proves that they are far from satisfactorily 
acknowledging women’s unique methods of empowerment in eastern and southeastern 
regions (Ertürk 1995: 146-149). The reports that were carried out under the State 
Planning Organization (SPO), almost without an exception, emphasize conventional 
women’s tasks and ignore production-oriented tasks of women—even the ones with a 
gender component. In that sense, efforts to reduce regional disparities cannot 
satisfactorily address the issue at stake, because they conceptualize the structure in 
these regions, first, as underdeveloped, and second, as immutable.  
                                               
24
 Translation mine.  
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3.2. Orientalist Tendencies of Kemalist Women 
On a more theoretical level, while the problems that Kemalists depict about 
women in the eastern and southeastern regions of the country might be loosely based on 
an accurate evaluation, the hegemonic “othering” that it incurs makes this discourse 
problematic. Secondly, with the help of this discourse, Kemalist nationalism constructs 
the women in the eastern parts of Turkey as, borrowing Mesut Yeğen’s terms, 
“Prospective-Turks” (Yeğen 2009), or potential “to-be-emancipated” subjects—
subjects always attempting to arrive at, yet perpetually deferred a priori from, modern 
liberation. This problematic approach attributes superiority to the Kemalist tutelage 
over the “inferior” Kurds in general, and Kurdish women more in particular. Hence, as 
Metin Yüksel accurately argues, Kurdish women have been exposed to a “double 
marginalization” (Yüksel 2006: 777-802). For, as he argues, two dimensions of 
Kemalist policies come together and result in the “dismantling of the Kurdish ethnic 
identity concomitant with the ‘emancipation’ of Turkish women” (777). On the one 
hand, “their ethnic identity was severely crushed and on the other hand they became 
relatively disadvantaged and underprivileged compared to their Turkish counterparts 
who were potentially able to benefit from the secularizing and modernizing Republican 
reforms” (777). Yüksel goes on to say that this discrepancy between Kurdish women 
and their Turkish counterparts resulted in a wide social status gap between the two 
parties.  
The Kemalist attitude that enforces top-down legislations, ignoring the realities 
and specificities of certain groups, regions, etc. has been a characteristic of state 
reforms in Turkey that started with the Kemalist reforms and continues today. Rather 
than expecting the laws to penetrate into the social sphere, the regulations that vary 
from one region, one ethnic group, or sect to another gain importance in the context of 
Turkey, whose regulations remained very restricted in terms of their prevalence in 
different regions of the country. More importantly, considering the above-mentioned 
conditions in eastern Turkey, the rhetoric of the “backward” east obscures the 
sociopolitical reasons underlying this fact by breaking its ties with the problematic 
implementation of the western style civil code in Turkey. The problems women 
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experience in the region is solely attributed to regional specificities and “backwardness” 
without considering their direct relation as responses to state ideology. 
In her examination of the “modern family” as a new regulatory discourse, 
Kandiyoti (1997) presents an insightful theory about the discourse of 
“underdevelopment.” She states that, as with any other regulatory discourse, the ideal of 
the modern bourgeois family requires an Other that needs to be civilized. In a similar 
vein, normalizing certain articulations of sexuality and gender is based on the criticism 
and stigmatization of this Other. She further argues that modernizers can thus shape the 
image of their modern family by contrasting it to their Others, who are considered to be 
in need of reforms a priori (Kandiyoti 1997: 103). Another character of modernizers is 
overlooking the question of whether these structures they stigmatize exist in their own 
societies. The same process of othering and stigmatizing seems to have taken place in 
the form of the “underdeveloped” eastern women. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
Kurds/easterners were constructed as the Other of the Turkish identity. Similarly, the 
urban elite women of the republican period, who benefited from the Kemalist reforms, 
perceived their Kurdish counterparts as “underdeveloped,” because they needed, to 
borrow Makdisi’s term, their own “proving grounds” for their own modern status.  
 
3.2.1. The Role of Education 
As the desired developments with regard to women's rights have been 
considered an inextricable part and an indicator of Turkey’s modernization and 
Westernization, the question was reduced to that of extending these policies to larger 
masses, particularly by the means of education. Mass-schooling was one of the main 
activities of the Turkish Republic in its formative years. While it seems to be devoid of 
ideology’s mark at first glance, education, is in fact a powerful tool for shaping and 
altering formation of an individual in society as well as in the public realm. It carries the 
potential of indoctrinating people for or against political systems (Kaplan 1999: 12). As 
in other projects of nationalism, education was productively used in the establishment of 
Turkish nationalism.While the discourse of the state was to empower women across the 
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country, education was also instrumentalized in the dissemination of the image of a 
modern Turkey (Saktanber 2001). In eastern provinces, on the other hand, the role of 
education was geared both toward Turkification and the civilizing mission. Having 
given a theoretical background for the formation of a Kemalist figure of ideal modern 
woman, I would like to exemplify it with a case study where the civilizing mission of 
Kemalist women par excellence is at work. Dağ Çiçeklerim (2004) [My Mountain 
Flowers] by Sıdıka Avar might serve here as an example of Turkification policies 
through education as well as the beginning of the “backwardness” of Kurds.  
3.2.2. Dağ Çiçeklerim 
Sıdıka Avar was born in 1901 in Istanbul. She studied at the Çapa Teacher 
School. After she graduated in 1922, she started to work as a Turkish teacher at İzmir 
American Girls' College in 1925. In 1939 she was appointed to the Elazığ Girls' 
Institute. Between 1939 and 1943, she worked in various cities in the eastern and 
southeastern provinces until she became a principal at the Elazığ Girls’ Institute in 1949. 
She witnessed twenty years of eastern Anatolia. Dağ Çiçeklerim is her posthumously 
published memoir which she wrote in 20-year-period. According to the publisher, she 
was sent there as a “Turkish missionary.” According to the book, the vast majority of 
her students were of Kurdish origin. Quotations from this book will serve as examples 
of instances when a Kemalist women meet eastern Turkey. According to her memories, 
she had a very idealist approach to the children she met, and she took action in order to 
improve their conditions. She especially tried to prevent the mistreatment of the children 
who studied at the boarding school. Yet, the stance of the other personnel in the school 
is an example of the general opinion of Kurds being “backward,” and shows the 
accumulation of hatred towards due to the disobedience of Kurds.  
 During her first months, Avar is surprised by a peculiar situation. Children of the 
state officials study in the institutes while the children of the villagers study at the 
boarding house. Avar points out many times the hierarchy between these two groups by 
telling that “Institute students are always belittling the boarding school students; the 
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boarding school students, on the other hand, always have an inferiority complex” (Avar 
2004: 28). In her explanation of this inferiority complex, she illustrates their physical 
destitution and dilapidation because of the lack of care from the teachers and janitors, as 
Avar finds out later. Moreover, the janitors make boarding school students work in the 
kitchen and clean the school, etc. When Avar finds about this, she protests and tries to 
take action against it.  
One of the most striking themes behind the memoir is Turkification, which is 
expressed in a stunningly unequivocal way. “Most of them are the girls of the villages 
where the incidents of rebellion were experienced. Beautiful, ugly, or rebellious…They 
are all human after all,” the readers get the impression that Avar was approaching the 
girls purely with compassion. However, when it is followed by “These wounded hearts 
should be treated with love and compassion and should be integrated with Turkishness” 
(Avar 2004, 33), it turns out that this approach was in fact a strategy to carry through 
the goal of Turkifying these Kurdish girls. Avar very clearly defines herself as a 
“Turkish missionary” whose primary mission is to assimilate Kurdish children into the 
Turkish identity. As a teacher of Turkish, her task had foremost importance. The 
importance of Turkish came from the fact that not knowing it was considered to be the 
reason for poverty: “Atatürk said that in these mountain villages all poverty came from 
not knowing Turkish and he saw it as one of the reasons of rebellion. Therefore, he 
wanted Turkish to be introduced to these villagers with 'mothers'. This was the most 
permanent education” (Avar 2004: 33).  
 The children are called “mountain children” by the janitors and other teachers at 
school with the suggestion that they are not affected by cold or mistreatment, unlike 
urban children (Avar 2004: 36). When Avar finds out that the janitors make the children 
work, the response of the janitor is also significant in emphasizing the “mountain” 
theme. Avar asks if carrying wood or cleaning the rooms are not the responsibility of 
the janitors. The janitor answers: “Of course they will do these tasks. These are the 
offsprings of the rebellious Kurds, they are mountain bears” (Avar 2004: 39). Although 
Avar does not note her own response, in general she does not react against it. She just 
tries to treat children properly herself and improve their conditions by ensuring that they 
get their proper share when food is served. In other instances, she tries to intervene in 
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the mistreatment of the rest of the staff.
25
 However, her primary concern is rather about 
the integration of the children to the Turkish nationality than mistreatment, which is 
disclosed the moment she says “how are these children supposed to be integrated to the 
Turkish identity against these kinds of harsh punishments?.” (Avar 2004: 46).  
The last quote I want to add is about the moment when Avar is appointed as the 
principal of another girl’s school. The current principal explains Avar’s new role at that 
schools as “Now as the Turkish Missionary, you will assimilate the boarding school 
students. This is at Atatürk’s own behest. It would offend the local public if you let 
anyone feel this. Be cautious accordingly.” And Avar reassures herself by saying: “Did 
I not study at the Gazi Education Institute for that objective?” (Avar 2004: 47).  
There are certain themes that I want to invoke regarding the quotes from Dağ 
Çiçeklerim. The first one of these is the very obvious task of Turkification. The Kurds 
are considered to be “prospective-Turks” who need to be integrated into that culture 
with the compassion of a ‘mother’ like Sıdıka Avar. As Avar herself notes, she was 
educated for the task of Turkification at the Gazi Education Institute, suggesting that 
this is the cultural policies that the state implements at educational institutions. In that 
sense, during her education Avar and other teachers, especially women, were trained to 
be ‘mothers’ who are responsible for the construction of a homogeneous national 
identity.  
Motherhood has another significance in the context of Kemalist women 
discourse. In the early republican years, there was an emphasis on “motherhood” which 
expressed itself in many of Atatürk’s speeches. For example, “The greatest mission is 
motherhood. When it is acknowledged that the lap of a mother is where the first 
education is given, the importance of that responsibility is better understood” (Toska 
1998: 79). What the quotes from Dağ Çiçeklerim illustrate is that the role of 
motherhood was not restricted to the borders of family, but was expanded with the 
inclusion of conveying the new nation’s values as well as the new Turkish identity in 
various parts of the country. The fact that the eastern parts were in a political turmoil 
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 In her comprehensive study on Dağ Çiçeklerim, Zeynep Türkyılmaz demonstrates how some of Avar’s memoirs 
contradict the accounts of her students.  
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due to the outbursts of rebellions by Kurdish communities necessitated a special 
treatment of these territories. In that sense, the role of education acquired another 
meaning in eastern regions. This role can be put on a par with the “White Man’s 
Burden” when one considers the treatment of the other teachers and janitors in Avar’s 
memoir. Kurds, as “Mountain Turks,” should be taught the “truth” about their origins 
and education, in the first place, served that end. This mission was accorded to educated 
Kemalist women. They were expected to make use of their maternal feelings towards 
children, which carries a particular importance. On the one hand, assimilation would 
take place with a subtlety. On the other hand, women would play an instrumental role in 
the construction of the Turkish nation yet again.  
The motif of “The White Women’s Burden” comes into the scene in the memoir 
once more when the role of Turkish language is defined. When Avar thinks about 
Atatürk’s explanation of the “underdevelopment” and “poverty” of eastern regions, 
which Avar seems to agree with, Turkish emerges as the criterion of development, 
which is problematic in every sense of the word. When they learn Turkish, the road to 
development will open up once and for all. Within that equation, the civilizing mission 
that Avar assumes is justified, because the correction of the problems that arise from the 
language was for the benefit of the region. This is quite similar to how Orientalism 
works on the level of discourse. Orientalism, as I explained more in detail in Chapter 2, 
is a “system of knowledge about the Orient” (Said 1978: 6), which assumes the 
authoritative role of representing the Orient without making reference to the reality. The 
Orient, from the perspective of Orientalists, should be represented and guided for their 
own good.  
The discourse revolving around the need for guidance provided the Orientalists 
the discursive tools of justifying their deeds. In a similar way, Kemalist discourse first 
stigmatized its own east as being destitute and poor, because it was subservient to its 
goals of Turkification. Kurdish, even without uttering it, is suggested to be the language 
of underdevelopment, which emerges as the exact opposite of the language of 
civilization, that is, Turkish. This process eventually creates the “relationship of power, 
of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said 1978: 5). For, during 
the process stigmatization of Kurds and Kurdish and set apart from the rest of the 
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country, simultaneously Turkish and Turkish nationality is constructed in a way that 
suggests its progressive character, and association with modernity and Western values. 
Finally, I should note that this process of national identity formation testifies to the idea 
that “Nationalist projects are simultaneously gender projects” (quoted in Zeydanlıoğlu 
2008). In Chapter 4, my discourse analysis of Kemalist women will be based on that 
argument, because I contend that especially in the early years of the republic, women 
played an important role in the dissemination of Turkish nationalism. Related to their 
significant role in Turkish nationalism, their stance towards Kurds acquires special 
importance.  
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CHAPTER 4 
KEMALIST DISCOURSES ON KURDISH WOMEN IN THE 1990s  
4.1. The Political, Social, and Cultural Framework of the 1990s 
This chapter will explore the problematic employment of Orientalist and 
Occidentalist discourses about the Kurdish population in the context of the 1990s. My 
main point of departure in choosing the 1990s was the rise of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement which challenged the “homogeneity” discourses of Kemalist nationalism. 
What makes the 1990s salient is the fact that it was a time when the state was forced to 
come to terms with the rising challenge of radical Islamic and Kurdish nationalist 
movements in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'état (Göle 1999). The PKK (Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party) waged an armed struggle against Turkish forces beginning in 1984 for 
the recognition of the Kurdish population. The specificity of the 1990s lies in the fact 
that the Kurdish national movement in the 1990s brought an unprecedented visibility 
and, I argue, marked an historical moment of reversal, as political actors holding 
important positions started to publicly express their Kurdish origins. One striking 
example of those instances is the prime minister Turgut Özal’s public statement in 1991 
that his grandmother is probably of Kurdish origin. This statement took place under 
relatively less “negotiable” conditions of claiming or disproving Kurdish origins than 
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before this time. Before, Kurds were enthusiastically integrated into society as a major 
part of social engineering projects, yet with the primary condition of denying the 
existence of a distinctive Kurdish identity. Özal’s meeting with the Northern Iraqi 
leaders Barzani and Talabani was another taboo-breaking/iconoclastic moment. Not 
surprisingly, this meeting created an uproar in the public arena and was criticized 
harshly by Özal’s opponents on the grounds that he was not taking conventional 
external policies into account (Aydın and Yüksel 2014: 396). When compared to the 
Law of 2932 which banned speaking Kurdish issued by the military military 
government in 1983, these statements by leading politicians in the 1990s illustrates the 
softening of the Kurdish question, at least on a discursive level.  
In the political arena, the CHP remained suspended from 1981-1992 after the 
military rule banned all political parties. In the interim, the Kemalists were represented 
by two political parties: the DSP (Democratic Leftist Party) and the SHP (Social-
Democratic Populist Party) although these parties underwent certain separations as well 
as unifications, which I will not delve into due to the limits of the thesis. With specific 
regard to the Kurdish question, the SHP’s decision to nominate Kurdish deputies on the 
lists of southeastern cities in the election of 1991, marks an important point in the 
political history of Turkey (Aydın and Taşkın 2014). However, this attempt to have 
Kurdish representation in parliament failed when these Kurdish deputies went to take 
their oath in the parliament, which resulted in chaos among the Turkish Public, leading 
to the eventual resignation of the deputies (Göle 1999: 55). Against this backdrop, in 
1992, the CHP reopened and started to once again represent the Kemalists while the 
DSP also catered to Kemalist ideology.  
Taking these paradigms into account, an analysis of the Kemalists’ (as well as 
the state’s) discourse on Kurdish women in the 1990s would reveal, firstly, to what 
extent the discussions in earlier chapters apply to the 1990s, and secondly, to what 
extent the impasse created in Turkish society by Occidentalism and Orientalism has 
been overcome. I consider the CHP pamphlet
26
 on “Being a Woman in Southeast 
Anatolia” to be at the nexus of all the paradigms the present thesis engages. Drawing on 
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 This pamphlet will be referred as CHP from now on within in-text references. 
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Fatmagül Berktay’s insightful argument that the complications arising from the 
polarization between the eastern and western regions of Turkey are symbolically 
projected onto gender identities, I would like to explore whether the above-mentioned 
polarization created by an Orientalist perspective was symbolically reflected in the 
relationship between Kemalist women and eastern/Kurdish women (Berktay 2003). 
Secondly, I would like to question whether the same tendency in Orientalizing Kurdish 
women was at work in the 1990s or whether Kemalist women were trying to go beyond 
the discourses of “an underdeveloped” eastern and southeastern region.  
 
4.2. Background of the CHP Women’s Branch 
The Republican People's Party was the first party to organize women's branches 
in Turkey. Preparation for the foundation of this branch started with the changes made 
in the CHP constitution in the 1950s, which allowed the formation of separate 
organizations at the provincial level (Çadır 2011: 55). The functioning of the CHP’s 
Women’s Branch was interrupted during the 1980 coup d’état, which suspended all 
political parties at the time. However, the Women’s Branch tried to continue its 
operations through women’s committees.  
In the CHP Women's Branch Constitution, the aim of establishing women's 
branches was defined as follows: "To make the CHP more widely adopted among 
various sections of the society, especially women, to spread the rules of procedure, the 
Program Decision, the Declaration of Election, the decisions of the Grand Congress, the 
principles and policies set by the Party Parliament, to contribute to the participation of 
women as free and equal individuals in all spheres of social life, in the family and 
working life [and] in politics" (CHP 2015: 195).
27
 However, this branch is defined as a 
subsidiary to the main body of the political party (ibid: 197). Since 1997, the CHP has 
adopted the election-based principle for the appointment of provincial women's branch 
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 Although this quotation is from a very recent CHP legislation, it seems as if these articles are kept intact since the 
foundation of the branch. At least, the earliest version of that regulation dated to 2001 and there are no differences 
between the 2015 and 2001 version.  
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organizations as well as the head of the women’s branch. However, this principle 
contradicts the rules regarding the “dismissal” of the people in charge of organizing the 
women’s branches. This rule states that the women’s branch organizations can be 
dismissed by the CHP administrations of the same level or by women’s branches from 
upper levels of the organization. A poignant example of this was true for Güldal 
Okuducu in 2007. Okuducu was the leader of the CHP’s women’s branch when the 
CHP pamphlet was issued in 1998. The significance of this contradiction for the 
analysis of the CHP pamphlet lies in the fact that Okuducu was dismissed by the party 
leaders in 2007, which demonstrates how women who are active in the women’s branch 
can be sidelined unlike other members of the party. This dismissal can be symbolically 
important in the evaluation of the pamphlet, as I will illustrate later.  
4.2.1. The CHP Pamphlet on Kurdish Women 
The CHP’s Women’s Branch planned to organize the Regional Women’s 
Congress in 1998 with the contention that the economic, social and cultural conditions 
throughout the country were different regionally, and thus had different impacts on the 
standards and styles of life. The aims of such congresses were to attend to the voice of 
the “locals,” their demands and concerns (CHP pamphlet: Being a Women in 
Southeastern Anatolia, 5). The first session of these women’s congresses took place on 
February 21, 1998 in Siirt, a city in southeastern Anatolia. The committee organized 
door-to-door visits to the most remote parts of the city. Based on this congress, the 
Women’s Branch issued the pamphlet that I will analyse here. It should be noted, 
however, that these congresses did not take place in other regions despite the original 
plan. As the pamphlet published makes clear, the topic published immediately was the 
one on southeastern women, suggesting the urgency of the situation. 
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Figure 1. The cover page of the CHP pamphlet. 
 
Before embarking on a discourse analysis of the pamphlet, I would also like to 
draw its outline and make a brief comment on its structure. The pamphlet opens with a 
picture that shows the CHP leader, Deniz Baykal, touching the face of a “stereotypical,” 
veiled woman (See Picture 1). The image conveys a feeling of intimacy to the audience. 
However, the only picture included in the pamphlet is the one that depicts the male 
leader of the party, Deniz Baykal. There is no visual that demonstrates the door-to-door 
visits of women, which is surprising considering the fact that both the congress and the 
pamphlet are the results of the women’s branch’s efforts. The picture that portrays 
Baykal and the typical elderly woman conveys all too well the message of a 
compassionate and embracing political leader. This message of compassion is 
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reinforced with the timidity and weakness in the woman’s eyes. These messages are put 
into words by the informal subtitle of the picture which reads “To be oppressed one 
after the other, generation by generation…”28 While the word “oppression,” which is a 
stronger word choice then “suppression” as it is tended to be used in women’s 
problems, implies the difference of Kurdish/eastern women’s problems and experiences 
of the rest of women. Oppression also emphasizes the physicality of the mistreatment in 
contrast to the less physical and more emotional word of suppression, which might be 
invoking the typical image of high domestic violence in the region, thereby featuring 
women’s body. The oppression’s quality, going on “generation by generation,” on the 
other hand, refers to longevity, almost giving it a sense of immutability-echoing both 
the formative year’s reports and the CHP Report on Eastern and Southeastern Regions 
published in January 1999.  
The pamphlet consists of five chapters, which focus on marriage and family life, 
educational problems, health problems, working life problems, and a closing chapter 
devoted to the media coverage of the congress organized on February 21, 1998. The 
first point that draws one’s attention in these chapters is the choice of words that invoke 
emotions, as is the case with the subtitle of “to be oppressed one after the other, 
generation after generation.” The opposite page is designed almost in the form of verse, 
whose lines rhyme with each other. In that sense, from the first pages on, the pamphlet 
gives the impression that it breaks its ties with the previous formal reports on the region. 
While the earlier reports were predominantly of an informative nature, this pamphlet 
prepared by women addresses the emotions by creating a rich atmosphere of regional 
women ululating and lamenting for their losses, which, perhaps, can be explained by the 
gender of the authors.  
The pamphlet is designed in a format that makes abrupt transitions in form and 
tone ranging from a party propagandist approach to a lyric tone embroidered with 
rhetorical questions;It calls for attending to the plight of women under the “oppression 
of terror, unemployment, under-education, men, violence” as early as the very first 
page. In an abrupt transition, it jumps to statistical data from the regional development 
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 “Peşpeşe, kuşaklar halinde ezilip gitmek....” in its original. 
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administration’s “Research on Women's Status and Integration into the Development 
Process” conducted in 1994 by the Turkish Development Foundation. This statistical 
data on the sociological level, however, is made consistent with the surrounding lyric 
and dramatic tone by the titles on quote (from whom they are quoted remains yet to be 
answered, though I gather that it is the “voice” of the pamphlet).  
Having provided an outline of the structure and tone of the pamphlet, I will now 
embark on an analysis of certain themes that come to the fore within the discussion of 
the new facet of the Orientalism/Occidentalism of Kemalist ideology in the 1990s. In 
doing so, I would like to analyze the faultlines of the discourses articulated in it, in order 
to locate them within the larger framework of Kemalist ideology in the 1990s vis-à-vis 
Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish women in particular. Methodologically, it should also 
be noted that I do not intend to refer to the Kemalists as if they were a monolithic group. 
Yet, in order to present an analysis of the pamphlet in question, throughout the paper, I 
will approach the pamphlet as if it represented the basic convictions and tenets of 
Kemalism while keeping my reservations toward such a simplified stance. 
4.2.2. Regional Disparities Revisited: Western and Eastern Women’s Experiences 
Throughout the pamphlet’s chapters, the educational, health, domestic, and 
employment issues of southeastern women are located within the larger scene of a 
destitute southeastern Anatolia. The way these topics are handled in the pamphlet very 
much echoes earlier portrayals of the region, that emphasize insufficiency in the 
infrastructure, societal underdevelopment, and feudalism. Numerous similar portrayals 
of the eastern and southeastern regions range from various reports submitted to the state 
in the early republican period
29
According to the pamphlet, educational levels are low, 
unemployment is high, and health services are insufficient.
30
 Geographic challenges and 
terror brought about migration from the region. Still, the population growth rate is two 
times higher than the country’s average due to the extended family tradition. The feudal 
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 A detailed study on these regions in the early republican period is presented in Doğu Anadolu ve Cumhuriyet 
Bürokrasisi [Eastern Anatolia and Republican Bureacracy], ed. Tuba Akekmekçi and Muazzez Pervan (2011) based 
on a a deputy who served in the eastern Anatolia, Necmettin Sahir Sılan’s archive.  
30
 http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/chp-kurt-raporu.pdf 
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system that is characterized by the agha system and tribes, claims the pamphlet, has 
been kept intact, resulting in poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. The Töre (mores) 
and the feudal system of the region entails polygamy, extended family, kin marriages, 
religious (non-official) marriages, philoprogenitiveness, and domestic violence, among 
other problems. The pamphlet portrays the women of the region as victims of the 
accumulation of these dimensions. Similarly, it suggests that these characteristics of the 
region also account for underdevelopment. All of these portrayals echo both the 
formative year’s reports and the CHP Report on Eastern and Southeastern Regions 
published in January 1999. 
The first fallacy of the pamphlet derives from its reluctance to assign a 
historicity that acknowledges the specifics of the region. It does not specify a 
timeframe. It does not portray certain differences or changes from one period of time to 
another. It just contends that women are being oppressed “generation after generation” 
and “one after the other.” The pamphlet also breaks up the inherent relationship between 
the region’s problems and the way reforms were carried out. The centralized state in the 
republican period adopted a top-down method of putting the reforms into practice, 
which had its impact on the composition of society. What I refer to here is the uneven 
implementation or reception of the reforms in different regions of the country. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, in the aftermath of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, 
several reforms were made regarding women ranging from the adoption of the Turkish 
civil code inspired by the Swiss Civil Code to the outlawing of polygamy,to granting 
equal rights to women and men to permitting women to take the custody of children. 
The disparities in terms of implementation and reception of the reforms apply equally to 
the success of the reforms geared toward women. There were great disparities between 
regions in terms of the reforms’ success. Deniz Kandiyoti critically observes the 
following:  
It is a fact that Kemalist reforms remained a dead issue for a long time, 
especially in those rural areas most weakly integrated into the national 
economy. The avoidance of civil marriage in favor of the religious 
ceremony, with the related possibility of polygamy, repudiation, and 
illegitimacy; the marriage of underage girls; the demand for "baslik 
parası" (brideprice) in the marriage contract; the denial of girls’ rights to 
education; and the emphasis on women’s fertility were continuing signs 
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of the uneven socio-economic development of the country. (Kandiyoti 
1987: 322) 
Success in the application of those reforms did not apply to all women in the 
country as was demonstrated in the third chapter. The reason behind this is the fact that 
the reforms regarding women were not received evenly by all women in the country. 
While the urban bourgeoisie could effectively benefit from them, rural women’s 
experiences did not change for a long time, creating a cleavage—or rather consolidating 
a split that already existed—in the country in terms of women’s experiences (Kandiyoti 
1987: 322). Kandiyoti is not the only one who notices the exclusive success of the 
reforms for women. Umut Azak also interprets the same selectivity on the basis of 
access to education (Azak 2010: 11). From Azak’s perspective, the point that needs to 
be emphasized is not how deeply this region is underdeveloped, but rather why it is. The 
process of structuring the region as solely underdeveloped defines what the region is. In 
a similar vein, while the urban bourgeoisie began to be presented as the “modern” and 
“secular” face of the republic, women in the countryside, especially in the eastern and 
southeastern regions, are labeled as the locus of “backwardness.”  
Considering the extent to which these reforms were applied to different spheres 
of society, the two sides of the pole were the urban bourgeois women, who had 
generally been represented by the CHP—and who, in return, represented CHP, as 
discussed in the third chapter—and rural women. Yet, this is not to claim that women in 
the same social class had the same experiences, nor that these categories represent 
homogenous experiences of womanhood. Here I aim to point to the two edges of the 
pole and acknowledge the variation of these experiences, as a way of pointing out that 
urban bourgeoisie women came to be associated with western values, secularism, and 
modernity over time, while rural women who had to preserve the existing experiences 
of womanhood, to a larger extent, came to be associated with religiosity, 
“backwardness,” and the “East.” The pamphlet stands at the point of encounter between 
these two poles. It is, then, important to question to what extent the authors of this CHP 
pamphlet can go beyond the euphemisms such as underdevelopment and victimhood.  
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On a statistical level, the explanations of the victimhood of southeastern women 
are supposedly supported by the statistics that compare the figures in the southeast with 
those of the average overall in Turkey. The discrepancy between the average rate of 
female “victimhood” in Turkey and the average in the region is unfairly magnified. 
Even if such a comparison would reveal “underdevelopment” in the region, a more 
credible and consistent comparison would require a comparison with other regions of 
the country as well. The authors of the pamphlet could also have adopted an approach 
that follows basic research methods such as looking at a dependent variable against an 
independent variable. Otherwise, the underdevelopment of the region remains a sticky 
and unsubstantiated discourse that reduces the region only to the sweeping 
generalizations that have been haunting the state discourse since CUP social 
engineering, which had its impact on all the development reports on the eastern and 
southeastern regions.  
4.2.3. The Civilizing Mission: Has Anything Changed? 
In the 1990s, the Kurdish question addressed through a depoliticized policy 
discourse revolving around “regional development” by the state (Ayata and Yükseker 
2005, 6). The towns and cities predominantly inhabited by the Kurdish population were 
considered to be the least developed in the country. Even prior to the 1990s, the Turkish 
state had already started to cling to the discourse of underdevelopment more strongly in 
the Kurdish regions, embarking on the Southeastern Anatolian Development Project 
(GAP) in the 1980s (extending to the 1990s)—an extension of the “developmental” 
approach to the eastern and southeastern regions’ problems.  
Delving further into these developmentalist approaches and the rise of the armed 
national Kurdish struggle takes us to the even more profound background of the internal 
displacement of the Kurds both in the big cities as well as on the peripheries of eastern 
cities. Although the figures vary by source, according to the official parliamentary 
investigation report in 1998, it is estimated that 378,335 people were internally 
displaced in the Kurdish-populated southeastern and eastern provinces of Turkey in the 
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1990s during the “low-intensity conflict” between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
guerillas (Ayata and Yükseker 2005). Yet the figures reported by certain human rights 
organizations are more drastic: the estimates go as high as three million people (Ayata 
and Yükseker 2005). In addition, according to the UNHCR’s paper on “Voluntary 
Repatriation of Turkish Refugees” (Ayata and Yükseker 2005), approximately 13,000 
people fled to northern Iraq. What follows from this internal displacement is a new kind 
of visibility for Kurdish women. That is, eastern women and the problems they 
experience come to the surface as a more pressing issue than before. During this volatile 
period, the Kurdish population and Kurdish women encountered the urban population 
and urban women, especially in metropols like Istanbul. Within that context the two 
poles, urban Kemalist women and rural Kurdish women, gain a ground of confrontation.  
This confrontation is made possible through the migration wave. Migration from 
eastern regions to metropols was already taking place by the 1990s, mostly because of 
economical motivations, i.e. finding a job in an urban setting. However, with the terror 
reigning in the eastern and southeastern regions, migration began to be driven by two 
additional reasons, because people in the eastern and southeastern regions were 
subjected to internal relocation for political reasons throughout the 1990s. Internal 
relocation took place in two different ways: the first wave was a result of threats from 
security forces, the PKK, and government-employed security guards; the second was 
compelled by the feeling of insecurity due to armed clashes and military-imposed food 
embargoes. Faced with the turmoil in these regions, migration from the eastern and 
southeastern regions gained a new meaning for the inhabitants of urban setting: 
encounter with groups of people from the peripheries of the country.  
This encounter lends itself to one of the pamphlet’s most intriguing parts. 
Migration is invoked in the CHP pamphlet many times. The reason for this migration 
wave is acknowledged to be out of “necessity” when it is invoked as “[women who are] 
forced to migrate” (3). However, a frustration embedded in this acknowledgement is 
disclosed in the instances where the pamphlet poses the rhetorical question of (10), “do 
you live in your own country, [eastern women]?” (12). Here, the sense of “not being in 
your own country” is conveyed. The last quotation from the pamphlet is poignant in 
demonstrating the “white women’s burden”: “The people who migrate to the cities, the 
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ones who come with their own burdens, are now also the problem of urban people.” 
However, it is Orientalist discourse that is reconciled with the following sentence: 
“Women from the countryside and women from the cities will undergo and overcome 
this problem together.” 
Evaluations of these displacements reveal the “orientalist” attitude of Kemalists 
ideology, but also the way they attempt to overcome it. The authors first note the 
migration from this region, generalizing the southeastern region as “this region” and not 
specifying it as Siirt, to the urban centers, calling for a comprehensive transformation 
both in the region and in the places where its population relocated—generally the 
periphery of capital cities or city centers of the region. Integration programs are 
necessary to streamline the flow of immigration if it cannot be prevented. Integration 
programs, they argue, should include cultural and social projects. The peripheries 
(“varoşlar”) should be considered together as Southeast Anatolia, and they should be 
“enlightened” as a whole (CHP 1998: 14) The word choice of “enlightening” is 
significant here, as it first establishes the authors and their position as a norm, and then 
calls for a progressive change in the direction of that norm. The agenda of 
“enlightenment” bears a striking resemblance to Orientalism and its “civilizing mission” 
that Zeydanlıoğlu cogently expresses:  
[W]hen nationalist elites project the internalized Orientalism “inwards” as 
part of the nation-building process, the “native” emerges as an Other that 
becomes the target of “corrective” and “scientific” projects of modernity 
and process. The transformation of the native is undertaken through a 
return to the “disciplinary” narratives of the West (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 3). 
The second chapter briefly exemplified the “corrective” and “modernizing” projects of 
the type of modernity that the Kemalists envisioned. A newer version of the same 
project was at work in the context of the rapid relocation of the Kurds in urban settings, 
because this encounter reminds the elites of their “civilizing mission.” Once again, the 
elites attribute a representational right and leadership role to themselves in the process, 
from which they emerge as “modern” and “progressive.”  
Hence, we observe a constant emphasis on the “backwardness” of the Southeast, 
for which, repetitively, the “traditions” and the “feudal system” are made responsible. 
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The constant emphasis, I argue, is not only to invoke development in the region, but 
also differentiate the pamphlet’s authors as different from their subjects. By doing so, 
they establish a hegemonic structure between themselves and the people they are 
researching.  
Here I would like to quote certain parts of a report entitled “Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia’s problems,” which was originally published by the SHP in 1989 
when Deniz Baykal was the general secretary of the party. When the SHP and the CHP 
united in 1995, the CHP decided to publish sections from this report, addressing the 
‘Eastern Question,’ under the name of the CHP, because it was published by the SHP 
when Deniz Baykal, current leader of the CHP in 1995, was the general secretary of the 
SHP at that time. It begins by defining main challenges of Turkey:  
The main challenge that Turkey faces today is the removal of the 
constitutional and legal obstacles, institutionalization of democracy 
throughout the country, rapid development by industrialization, 
removal of social injustice and procurement of fair distribution of 
national income among people and territories.  
 
Both economic and social development and democracy are also the 
main objectives of SHP. It is unthinkable to put one in front of the other 
or to prioritize one over the other.  
 
Eastern and southeastern problems have a priority in the problems of 
the country. Human rights violations, terrorism and violence, economic 
backwardness, poverty, intense unemployment, insecurity and identity 
crisis are the main causes of these problems (SHP 1989/CHP 1995). 
 
The difference in the stance of that report is that it does not limit itself acknowledge the 
problems reigning in the eastern and southeastern regions, but also acknowledge the 
complicity of the state in what was happening there. It clearly talks about the human 
rights violations and violence of the state, which had been unprecedented in the 
previous years. In that sense, it pioneers the movement that questions that stance of the 
state within the CHP.  
 The importance of that report also lies in the fact that it diverges from the rest of 
the reports on the eastern and southeastern provinces in that it clearly acknowledges a 
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distinct Kurdish language and culture: “In the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, a 
predominant part of the population is ethnically of Kurdish origin. For economic and 
political reasons in recent years, there has been a mass migration to western, central and 
southern Anatolian regions” (SHP 1989/CHP 1995). Although in the formation period 
of the republic, the fact that a predominant part of the population was of Kurdish origin 
was acknowledged,
31
 this information was always used in order to provide data for the 
plans of social engineering. That is, once the ethnic composition of these regions is 
known, it would be used to change that composition in the way the state wanted. It 
would, for example, would be used to decide in which parts of the country to relocate 
these Kurdish people, so that they would be integrated into the Turkish culture and 
hence Turkified. In the report dating to 1989, it is the first time that this information is 
not used in the service of social engineering.  
 Until 1995, the stance of the SHP and the CHP towards the Kurdish question 
was in line with this report. They both opposed military intervention as a solution to the 
Kurdish question. They both supported the cultural rights of Kurds to the extent of 
encouraging broadcasting and schooling in Kurdish, yet still contending that Turkish 
would remain the official language and language of instruction. They also criticized the 
emergency rule and village-guard system in these regions, which were the remnants of 
the social engineering (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 150).  
 Considering this acknowledgment of Kurds’ cultural rights, it seems plausible to 
argue that the CHP pamphlet succeeded in going beyond the state’s discourse in terms 
of including the Kurdish ethnic origin in the country. The very fact that they finally 
could break their inherent ties with the state demonstrates a change in their stance. 
However, the fact that they keep assuming the role of “enlightening” suggests that the 
Orientalizing tendencies proved to be a bigger challenge than acknowledging a distinct 
Kurdish identity.  
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 This information is based on Doğu Anadolu ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisi (1939-1951), ed. Tuba Akekmekçi and 
Muazzaz Pervan (2011).  
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4.2.4. The Pamphlet’s Stance vis-a-vis Contemporary Feminist Literature 
The specificity of the 1990s also lies in the inauguration of a new phase of the 
feminist movement in Turkey. With the challenges posed by the Islamist, Kurdish 
nationalist, and Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transsexual (LGBT) movements, certain 
cleavages emerged within the feminist movement itself. Each of these movements had a 
different perspective on the roots of women’s problems, which obliged the feminist 
movement to take these different perspectives into account. Among these perspectives, 
the Kurdish women’s groups (as part of the mass movements in the Eastern and South-
Eastern regions) drew attention to the dual exploitation that Kurdish women faced: first, 
the patriarchal tribal system dominant in Kurdish culture; and second, the imperialist 
system that the centralist state imposed on Kurds (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 42). There 
was a visible rise in non-governmental organizations throughout the country. Kurdish 
women’s associations were not an exception. Kurdish women’s organizations such as 
the KA-MER constituted an example of the institutionalization of the Kurdish women’s 
movement in the 1990s that challenged the unitary and nationalist vision (Diner and 
Tokbaş 2010: 46).  
There was a drastic rise of Kurdish feminist activism organized around journals 
and associations. A few of them are Roza, Jujin, Jin u Jiyan, and Yaşamda Özgürlük 
(Yüksel 2006, 780). Yeşim Arat’s observation of these organizations in comparison 
with their Turkish counterparts is as follows:  
While Turkish women in Turkey might have ignored their national 
identities in their activism, Kurdish women began organizing separately. 
Similar to other minority groups, dominated by the feminism of the 
majority, Kurdish feminists felt that their particular predicament could 
not be recognized within Turkish women’s groups. They organized 
around the journal Rosa, which began publication its in December 1996, 
in order to make themselves independent from the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, from men and from Turkish women. In an interview with the 
feminist journal Pazartesi, the editor of Rosa argued that within the 
Kurdish nationalist movement, women had to become like men to be 
taken seriously, which as feminists, was not what they wanted (Arat 
2000: 120-1). 
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This quotation, in the first place, concurs with the arguments of Kurdish women’s 
marginalization in the society and within Turkish women’s groups. Hence is their urge 
to organize under different institutions than existing Turkish feminist groups. Moreover, 
they not only took a distance from men and Turkish women, but also from Kurdish 
nationalist movement. Kurdish nationalist movement had significant impacts on 
Kurdish women, because it mobilized and politicized them. However, it is a shared view 
that these feminist Kurdish organizations distanced themselves from Kurdish national 
movement on the grounds that they were sidelined in the national struggle by their male 
comrades (Yüksel 2006: 780). Kurdish women began to question the subordination they 
were subjected to and criticized the expectation that they were not perceived as women 
in the national struggle, but rather viewed through sexist lenses (Ibid: 780).  
The emergence of Kurdish feminist groups is also striking when we juxtapose 
their rise to the CHP pamphlet’s portrayal of Kurdish women. The pamphlet leaves the 
impression that Kurdish women are suppressed to an extent that the audience does not 
expect any kind of political action from them except crying and clamoring, which is 
repeated many times in the pamphlet to the effect that it reinforces the impression of 
victim status of Kurdish women in the audience/reader. However, the rise of feminist 
groups reclaiming political agency suggests that Kurdish women could establish 
themselves as political subjects that take action to change the patriarchal system 
prevailing in the Kurdish nationalist movement (Yüksel 2006). However, the pamphlet, 
somehow, seems not to be aware of these Kurdish women organizations or journals like 
Rosa or Pazartesi. When the pamphlet addresses the solutions that should be sought in 
regard to domestic problems in the region, it finds that there is a profound need for 
getting organized politically. It states that “getting organized is going to be an important 
stronghold for southeastern women to overcome the problems that stem from the 
unique
32
 historical and cultural background of the region” (CHP 34). It goes on to say 
that “The dissolving feudal relationships should be replaced with modern mechanisms. 
Social participation and integration can only be make possible if this need is addressed” 
(Ibid 34). The primary suggestion of the women’s branch to solve these feudal 
relationships is the establishment of non-governmental organizations, voluntary 
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institutions, and occupational organizations. However right the authors of the pamphlet 
are, that they represent the region as devoid of such organizations they propose 
contradicts what Yeşim Arat’s portrayal of feminist organization.  
Apart from the journal Arat listed, certain women’s organizations were already 
carrying out activities that address unique needs of the region’s women. To give an 
example, a non-governmental organization, “Southeastern Women’s Culture Platform,” 
(SWCP) was founded in 1996 in Diyarbakır, a city in the southeastern region. Although 
their aim of “creating solutions to the problems of the region” sounds stereotypical, their 
additional goal of realizing this aim “without [making women in the region] move away 
from cultural values” appeals to women in the region. This goal also refers to the 
marginalization of the region’s women both because of the dynamics of the region and 
the women’s organizations that require them to “move away” from their cultural values. 
An article of this platform with the title of “The Reasons for Setting up the Southeastern 
Women’s Culture Platform” also discloses the same gap between women in the region 
and women’s organizations that carry out their activities on the region. This article 
states that dialogue has to be set up with the aim of creating a social and cultural 
cohesion among the society, and that the cultural accumulation of the region with its 
manifold facets should be communicated to the rest of the country (Erarslan 2002: 257). 
This inclusive stance of the Southeastern Women’s Culture Platform towards the 
already existing structures and values of the region, however, cannot be observed in the 
CHP pamphlet, suggesting that reconciliation with the structure or values of the region 
was not an easy task for the CHP.  
 
4.2.5. Emancipation of Women 
One striking point is that early in the pamphlet, a parallel is drawn between the 
emancipation of women and the development of society. The pamphlet delineates a 
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victim (the women) and a savior (society). This brings us to a central issue regarding 
women in Kemalist mentality: The pamphlet construes women as “receiving” 
emancipation through an agent separate from themselves. Society, or the elites in 
society who inform and enlighten it, are the saviors of the victims. The problem that lies 
in this conceptualization is the reluctance to acknowledge women’s agency through 
which they may struggle for their own cause. 
This conceptualization carries a striking analogy with the supposed 
“emancipation” of women through the reforms of the Kemalist Republican period. The 
empowerment of women in the Republican period holds true to a certain extent. 
However, as it was discussed earlier, these reforms were restricted in their impact on the 
overall society. They were effective mainly for an urban group who already had an 
urban socio-economic family background, for they created a space where women were 
able to work and live more independently than in the previous period. However, for 
other regions, particularly the rural regions, the reforms did not bring any substantial 
changes to women’s daily experiences of womanhood (Kandiyoti 1987: 322).  
On the other hand, in the Turkish framework, the state is vested with an image 
of “Father State” (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008: 5). The discourse of “rescuing” women, I argue, 
resonates with this paternal mindset in the Turkish context, as it expects the state to 
break the existing structures, do something almost miraculous and “rescue” women 
from the uncivilized claws of a feudal system. In other words, the pamphlet draws on an 
image of change where the state intervenes in the existing system, which is blamed 
consistently for the failure of the emancipation of women. I will discuss this aspect 
later. In this sense, the people in the western regions of Turkey, such as the authors of 
this pamphlet, create an archetype of “the rescued woman” and the women in the 
Southeast remain on the other side of the border, without clarifying what this rescue 
actually denotes, or specifying what the criteria for that rescue would be.  
This kind of a portrayal of eastern women recalls Meltem Ahıska’s argument 
that in Orientalism and Occidentalism, the non-Western localities are treated as the site 
where people are “made” modern by others rather than “making” themselves modern. 
That is to say, these discourses render the very actors of the process of 
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modernization/Westernization mere passive receptors. However, Ahıska (2010) chooses 
to treat modernity as a “form of relationship to the present and to oneself” that emerges 
everywhere around the globe. Ahıska claims that this might have a liberating effect for 
non-Westerners. However, Ahıska maintains that this conception keeps the theoretical 
and political problems embedded in the modernist approaches intact. In her use of 
Occidentalism, it not only refers to something negative but actually reveals the complex 
field of the subjectivity of the Oriental which responds to the Orientalist gaze. 
The next question is: from what are women going to be “rescued?” The 
pamphlet acknowledges that the problems faced in the region affect women more 
negatively than men. It then moves on to discuss the societal structure that constrains 
women, the practices of which are all attributed to feudalism. Among the practices 
listed, the ones related more closely to women are presented in bold capital letters: They 
are “the trap of morals,” “child marriages,” “child motherhood,” 
“philoprogenitiveness,” “violence (both against women and towards other targets),” 
“Islamic marriages,” “kin marriage,” “marriage in exchange for blood feud,” 
“polygamy,” “dowry” and “honor killings” (CHP 1998: 20). However, this sensitivity is 
imbued with a patronizing tone labeling its targets as “behind” modern practices. The 
practices are all commonly attributed to pre-modernity and feudal society as in the 
statement “Replacement of feudal values with the modern values, without a doubt, will 
eradicate practices such as bride exchange, polygamy” (CHP 1998: 24), suggesting that 
these pre-modern practices do not exist in the modern, western part of Turkey 
enlightened by Kemalist doctrines.  
Throughout this list, the profile of the woman drawn by the pamphlet is one that 
has been left to live in poor conditions, subjected to violence by either her father or 
husband, left bereft of the right to her family inheritance, etc.; all situations from which, 
women need to be “rescued.” There is only one story of hope in which two girls, one at 
the age of 15 and the other 13, came to believe that they did not need to marry since 
they had already gained their economic independence from men (CHP 1998: 15). What 
they refer to with the detailed but repetitive descriptions and stories is also one of the 
major sources, according to the authors, of the region’s problem: the patriarchal system 
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and its constraints. However, the pamphlet does not specify what or who is responsible 
for the passive stance of these women.  
The members of the CHP women’s branch, on the other hand, are indirectly put 
in the status of strong, politically active, and independent women, which is the exact 
opposite of women portrayed in the pamphlet. What I will argue, however, is that the 
structure and tone of the pamphlet does not convey this feeling. That failure in 
conveying the message of empowered and politically active women stems from the lack 
of CHP women in the pamphlet. The cover page is dominated by the leader Baykal’s 
words, his own picture embracing a stereotypical southeastern woman-not women who 
actually executed the door-to-door visits. In addition, at no point in the pamphlet we see 
the name of Güldal Okuducu, the leader of the women’s branch. The women who 
visited and interviewed southeastern women are not credited neither at the beginning 
not at the end of the pamphlet. The only people who are credited and acknowledged are 
intellectuals who contributed to the preparation of the congress and the pamphlet. When 
women state their observations and make their suggestions, they always begin with an 
anonymous “We state as the CHP Women’s Branch,” and proceed with their arguments, 
which weaken the power their their statements. This anonymity is not what weakens 
their arguments per se, but they are weakened by the general lack of women’s faces, in 
the metaphorical sense of the word. This lack of the visibility of women who worked for 
this congress and pamphlet makes the reader question the portrayal of active role 
Kemalist women play in the politics. Considering the argument that Kemalism 
empowered women by giving them an assignment, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the lack of visibility of women as active subjects might suggest us that the CHP might 
have called women for duty, once again, to prove their role in the Kurdish question. 
Referring to the CHP report published in the 1995 (which was originally published by 
the SHP when Deniz Baykal was the general secretary), Baykal had expressed his pride 
in being the first party to refer to the Kurdish question in its party program (Kirişçi and 
Winrow 1997: 150). The activities of the women’s branch could complement this pride 
with their symbolism, reminding us of the symbolic role women played in the 
construction of a modern and western Turkey image.  
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4.2.6. Tradition vs Modernity 
The pamphlet states that the backwardness of the region affects women more 
than men and lays the blame on “tradition” and “feudal values.” “The social structure of 
the region generated by the traditions, morals (“töre”) and values of the feudal system 
reigning in the region both shapes and constrains women” (CHP 1998: 21). At this 
juncture, “feudal values, which maintain themselves through economic and social 
inequality” are taken to be responsible for the lack of women’s socialization, “tradition” 
being invoked as the explanation. Tradition is referred to in a very abstract way. It 
would seem that the pamphlet’s authors also resort to what Koğacıoğlu calls “the 
tradition effect,” which, she argues, rather than helping to get rid of the given problem, 
leads to its perpetuation by delimiting “the universe of meaning” through which it can 
actually be understood (Koğacıoğlu 1996: 121). In the pamphlet, too, employment of 
“tradition” in explaining the “backwardness” blurs what it is that actually stands in the 
way of women’s liberation. Given that what “the tradition effect” is doing might assume 
a lack of subjectivity on the part of women, they are portrayed as always already 
intimidated, without leaving room for change, except in one case where “The women 
have started to question,” referring to questioning the system, yet again with a tone that 
assumes this questioning as belated (CHP 1998: 29). This is also in line with 
Koğacıoğlu’s observation that “The traditions, especially the traditions of the “other” 
are considered static cultural features that are not easy to understand fully” (Koğacıoğlu 
1996: 121). 
In her discussion of the “subjectivity” of women, Deniz Kandiyoti’s concept of a 
“negotiated patriarchal system” might also be useful in interpreting the discourse of 
Kemalist women. She defines this system as follows: “In a given society that can have 
different diversities ranging from class, caste, and ethnic origin, if the women have set 
their life strategies within the framework of a set of concrete constraints of the society 
in which they live, it is a patriarchal negotiation system” (Kandiyoti 1996: 126). This 
system, she further explains, refers to a set of rules to which both genders have agreed 
and consented. This framework is helpful in understanding this specific case, since the 
portrayal of women as the subjects of violence under a patriarchal system seems to be 
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lacking the room for change both by the subjects of the system and the system itself. It 
contains people who are inevitably subject to change, either by the dynamics within or 
outside of the feudal system. Moreover, the relationship between them is due to the 
dialogue between the two sides. From this perspective, although the pamphlet aims at 
opening up a space for changing the situation, it actually delimits the conceptual and 
dynamic frameworks that might be helpful in pinpointing problems and, more 
importantly, grasping the case with all of its sophistication, contradictions, and 
coherences. 
4.2.7. Terror 
The insistent invocation of the sheikhdom and agha system is an important point 
that should be further analyzed, as these feudal societal structures are more specifically 
associated with the Kurdish population. In 1998, the Kurdish question was still a 
pressing issue, though it was abstracted under the term “terror.” The Kurdish identity 
movement was threatening the centralist Turkish republic. However, the issue was still 
not truly acknowledged and vocalized, but was rather circumvented in political 
discourse and in the media, resonating with Ahıska’s notion of displacing the root 
causes of problems onto an East-West/tradition-modernity dichotomy.  
The employment of the term “terror” is a key to understand the state’s approach 
to the Kurdish question. This choice is significant in the sense that it is a very political 
term, but one that conceals the political struggle behind it. In political discourse, the 
existence of the Kurdish question is only implied through the word “terror,” which is 
addressed many times as another major problem that maintains the “backward” status of 
the region. That is, such a major problem of the 1990s, with all of its historicity, is 
portrayed in a very reductionist manner. Similar to the handling of forced displacement, 
neither the ideological background nor its inherent relation to the population of the 
region is acknowledged. What terror actually refers to comes to the surface in a speech 
by Deniz Baykal. Baykal acknowledges that there is one thing for which the people in 
the Southeast region ask: creating job opportunities (CHP: 71). He complements this by 
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saying that another thing they ask for is “respect for one’s identity.” As a reflection of 
the CHP’s ideology that supports Kurds’ cultural rights until the 1995 together with the 
SHP,  
4.2.8. Relationship with the State: Did anything change? 
One of the defining qualities of the 1990s was the way in which Kemalism 
reframed its identity. In addition to fragmentation in political representation on the basis 
of the political party’s representatives, in the aftermath of the 1980 coup and the 
ensuing reactionary socio-political movements (including the emergence and rise of 
political Islam and the Kurdish nationalist movement), Kemalism itself underwent a 
transformation. Considered to be undesirable developments for the tenets of Kemalism 
in the formative years, Radical Islamic and Kurdish identity movements inevitably 
made their mark on the Kemalist ideology. As Necmi Erdoğan observes, Kemalism as 
an ideology underwent a restoration period in the 1990s to such an extent that, 
borrowing his terms, it was now considered to be “neo-Kemalism” (Erdoğan 2001: 584-
592). On the other hand, another group of scholars contend that the Kemalists’ reaction 
to the challenge of Islamist and Kurdish nationalist movements in the 1990s was 
actually an insistence on a return to the reliable “draconian methods of suppression first 
used in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997: 17).  
The authors of this pamphlet reflect this “neo-Kemalism” by the apologetic tone 
towards the people of southeastern and eastern regions. The statement that “There are 
governments which do not attend to the orphanage of the people”, for example, hold the 
state responsible for not being able to address problems of certain groups. Other 
instances when this apologetic tone is invoked are phrases such as “intimidated by the 
state” and “Turkey, all of us, owe an apology to the southeastern province” (CHP 1998: 
19). Although the last sentence reveals the “father-state” mentality, the way the 
governments and state are accused testifies Erdoğan’s observation about Kemalists in 
the post-1980. He states this as “Kemalist circles experienced a loss of trust towards the 
state after they had seen that the regime of 1980 coup embraced a Turkish-Islam 
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synthesis,” (Erdoğan 1985: 585). In that sense, Kemalists were losing their belief in the 
state apparatus as a cohesive element. As a result, Kemalism attempted to create a 
“civil” pedagogical mentality (Erdoğan 1985). A similar move toward a “civil” 
mentality can be observed in that this very congress is defined as an activity of a “social 
solidarity.”33 She contends that, although this project of social solidarity is not a lasting 
one, it is a first step taken towards a true dialogue. The same “civil” mentality is also in 
line with the suggestion of the establishment of non-governmental organizations which 
will take action in improving the living conditions of southeastern women.  
 The reasons underlying this move towards a “civil” mentality should also be 
traced to the fact that SHP and CHP had almost identical positions on the Kurdish 
question before they unified in 1995 (Kirişçi and Winrow, 150). However, this civil 
mentality, which corresponds to the same period of time with the adoption of the 
ideology of “social democracy”, was going to be abandoned towards the end of the 
1990s (Bila 1999: 122), and in the 2000s, nationalism was going to be adopted once 
more. This ideology of social democracy is invoked as “participatory democracy” in the 
pamphlet, which is planned to be put into practise by reaching out to the 
underprivileged parts of the society (CHP 1998:6). In that sense, the year of 1998 can be 
defined as a period marked by the transition from the ideology social democracy to 
nationalism. The fact that it was a transition period explains the ambivalent stance 
adopted by the member of the CHP.  
 
4.2.9. Reception of the Pamphlet in the Mainstream Media 
The CHP pamphlet made it into all three mainstream leftist-oriented 
newspapers: Milliyet, Hürriyet, and Sabah—although the media coverage is not 
restricted to these newspapers but also includes the less popular newspapers of Gündem 
and Kent. On February 17, 1998, Hürriyet reports about the congress that would take 
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 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/guneydogu-kadinina-merhaba-39006748. “Bizim çalışmamız bir sosyal dayanışma 
projesi olarak ele alınmalı.”  
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place on February 21 with the headline, “Good morning to the southeastern women,” 
referring to the first encounter between southeastern women and the CHP and revealing 
the latency of this encounter between Kurdish women and the CHP.
34
 It presents a very 
revealing part of an interview with the leader of the CHP Women’s Branch, Güldal 
Okuducu. According to Okuducu, “women who are educated, women who can think 
and understand, women who are aware of where their country is heading to do not have 
the right to take no action.” In that statement, Okuducu both reveals their mission as 
“educated” women as to take action against the problems of the southeastern women 
when explaining why they are at Siirt. Simultaneously, she demarcates themselves from 
the rural and “uneducated” women of the region. The word choice of “can” strengthens 
this demarcation with the implications of some women who do not have that capacity. 
In the following sentences, she states that the new policies should provide them with the 
tools that will enable them to understand each other. Here, she emphasizes 
establishment of a dialogue between the two parties, which is very progressive. Yet 
again, it demonstrates the lack of dialogue in the previous years.  
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 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/guneydogu-kadinina-merhaba-39006748. The original title is “Güneydoğu Kadınına 
Merhaba.” Okuducu’s original statement is “CHP Kadın Kolları Başkanı Güldal Okuducu, Türkiye’nin okumuş, 
yazmış, düşünen anlayan ve ülkesinin nereye gittiğinin farkında olan ve sorunların çözümlerinin neler olduğunu 
anlayabilen kadınlarının boş durmaya haklarının olmadığını belirterek şöyle konuştu.” Translation and emphasis 
mine.  
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Figure 2. Cumhuriyet coverage on February 22, 1998. 
The coverage of the newspaper Cumhuriyet is the most lengthy among the other 
newspapers (see Picture 2). In the image Cumhuriyet portrays, we encounter the 
stereotypical southeastern women and men in their traditional clothes while they are 
dancing (to be exact, halay, the traditional dance of Anatolia) arm in arm with the CHP 
leader Baykal, which gives the sense of proximity and sincerity on the part of Baykal. 
Yet again, we do not see any of the members of the CHP’s women’s branch. It 
contextualizes the congress with a detailed description in the introduction, congress 
duration, and the end. It also presents an interesting story about an instance at the 
congress. According to Cumhuriyet, the CHP leader Deniz Baykal and other party 
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leaders were welcomed with a flourish of trumpets by a large mass,
35
 showing the 
locals’ enthusiasm for meeting the CHP leaders. Three journalists report on the congress 
separately, illustrating significant attention they pay to this congress. Türey Köse and 
Kemal Kılıççıoğlu’s piece focuses on Baykal’s speeches, which occupy a huge place in 
the pamphlet as well. Miyase İlknur’s piece, on the other hand, vividly portray the 
atmosphere in the congress. While the original idea was to hold the congress in a sports 
hall, which sits 960 people, when the crowd doubled the expected number, the party 
leader decides to turn it into a rally. It turned out that Women from Siirt, who could not 
speak Turkish, interpreted the invitation for the congress as call for the distribution of 
foodstuff. When they notice that the distribution does not take place, they were calling 
the police and other officers account for it in Kurdish. This instance, I believe, 
illuminates the practical approach of women to the congress and lack of 
communication, symbolized in the difference in the language.  
Milliyet, on the other hand, prefers to narrate the story of a woman from the 
region, who questions if they lack anything compared to women in the western parts of 
the country. This woman called Havva Yürek, 38, expressed her feelings as follows:  
Do you know when I begin reacted? I reacted when I watched those TV 
channels, when I saw horizons that I had no idea of. I pondered about 
what they [women in the west] had they you do not have, what the 
difference between them and me was, why they were born to a totally 
different world than mine, and why we are forgotten and the world we 
live in is ignored by them. I could not find an answer. It's a shame, 
enough is enough. We are also alive and want to live. Why is there no 
work for us? [...] Because they do not care about us."
36
 
 As opposed to the pamphlet, Milliyet chose to give voice to a woman, who 
questions what the difference between the urban women with many opportunities ahead 
of them and herself is, which is expressed all too directly by the sentence “What do we 
lack?”. It shows, finally, how forgotten women felt themselves in the southeastern parts. 
More importantly, it is not expressed by a reference to the state and underdevelopment, 
but rather as a reference to privileged women, who lead a life that they can also watch 
on television. This narration is important, because it reveals the wide gap between 
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 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/guneydogu-kadinina-merhaba-39006748 
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women’s experiences in the eastern and western regions of Turkey and what kind of a 
tension it conceives.  
 
 
Figure 3. Milliyet’s coverage on the CHP congress in 1998. “What do we lack?” 
 
4.2.10. Cultural Encounters: The Kurdish Question Relocated to the Urban 
Context 
Although so far the two sides, the authors of the CHP pamphlet and women in 
Southeast Anatolia, look as if they are very neatly differentiated from one another 
without sharing anything in common, there is a dynamic which brings them together in 
the 1990s: the accumulation of a vast Kurdish population in the metropolises due to 
internal or forced displacement. In the pamphlet, migration is invoked various times. In 
the pamphlet and is represented as yet another problem caused by the underdevelopment 
of the region. It reads:  
Migrants, along with their troubles, have become the problem of urban 
dwellers as well. Women in the urban and rural regions will face the task 
of overcoming this together.  
Migration has a negative impact not only on the cities in the region but 
also outside of it. Many cities have been struggling under the pressure of 
this intensive migration flow. The problem has been carried to the 
metropolises too. The peripheries of Istanbul, Adana, and Mersin have 
turned into a new Southeast Anatolia. When we are creating solutions for 
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the Southeast, the new guests have to be taken into account. Projects 
which will accelerate the integration of the masses in the cities have to be 
developed parallel to each other. In short, the peripheries of the societies 
have to be taken into consideration along with the greater Southeast and 
have to be enlightened together with each other (CHP 1998: 13-14). 
The stance of the argument in this quotation regarding migration and its impacts 
on other cities reads ambivalently, yet it still encompasses something I find important. 
The newcomers to the city are called “guests” of the city, suggesting a hope that they 
would eventually become permanent residents of the urban areas. In this sense, this 
stance does not assume an equal partnership among the citizens, but rather creates a 
ladder of hierarchy, if not reinforces an already existing one, by positioning the current 
city residents on a higher level than its newcomers. Moreover, by the choice of the word 
“periphery,” denoting a higher negativity in Turkish than it does in English, enhances 
and reinforces the feeling of discontent. 
4.3. Conclusion 
In the 1990s, the CHP was undergoing a transition, to which the pamphlet I 
analyzed is a testimony. This transition was in line with the dissolution of the center 
and periphery cleavage, which was demonstrated most clearly in the rise of radical 
Islamic movement and the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question constituted one of 
the main challenges for the Turkish state and the CHP alike, as it was moving from the 
periphery and acquiring a central place in Turkish politics. In the first period of the 
1990s, the CHP, together with the SHP, took important steps in acknowledging the 
Kurdish identity. However, this acknowledgement, not surprisingly, had its own 
ambivalences that still carried the marks of Orientalizing tendencies. 
In the 75th anniversary of the republic and the CHP, the inherent ties between 
these two groups were being shattered. The CHP was on the way of forming a more 
“civil” identity. During this process, it was looking for support from different layers of 
the society such as the southeastern region. The southeastern region was both a 
“proving ground” for the modernity of the CHP and a new territory on which the party 
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could base its legitimacy. Hence was the apologetic tone of the pamphlet and the 
statements such as “people do not belong to the state, the state belongs to people.”  
Last but not least, the pamphlet I analyzed in this chapter suggests me that the 
CHP consulted, one more time, the symbolic role of women in conveying message of 
getting a new identity, by which I explain the inadequacy of the visibility of women in 
the pamphlet. The party allocated the women’s branch as a subsidiary/complementary 
role in the dissemination of its ideology. In a similar vein, although the pamphlet was 
the work of the women’s branch, the women who made this congress and the pamphlet 
possible could not take credit for it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In Turkish Studies, there has been a strong tendency to analyze the modern 
history of Turkey from the perspective of Westernization (Mardin 2006; Ahmad 1969; 
Berkes 1973; Zürcher 1998). Although this trend preserved its impact on the following 
scholarship produced in its wake, the opportunities that arise from that perspective have 
not been utilized when it comes to the perennial Kurdish Question. In this thesis, first, I 
argued that the simultaneous projects of Westernization and modernization brought 
about a certain Orientalist attitude towards Turkey’s periphery. I attempted to refine the 
social engineering theory with the inclusion of Orientalist and Occidentalist theories. I 
employed these theories because of the opportunities they provide to analyze Kemalist 
discourses with a particular emphasis on their developmentalist approach to the region. I 
employed Orientalism as a power mechanism that relies on othering based on 
geographical and temporal differences. I argued that in a similar way that the West 
assumed an ontological and epistemological distinction between the East and West, the 
center of Turkey created its own Other in the East through the creation of stereotypical 
images of eastern regions. Occidentalism, on the other hand, is employed to understand 
the role of the European Union in Turkish politics regarding the Kurdish Question. 
Occidentalism constituted the other focus of this study. The way I employed 
Occidentalism was “the sets of practices and arrangements justified in and against the 
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imagined ideal of ‘the West’ in the non-West” (Ahıska 2003, 266). As a process Said 
considered to be bound with Orientalism, Occidentalism further serves as a useful 
framework in the Kurdish Question, because it refers to the way in which the West 
emerges as a criterion/norm in the processes of decision-making in non-Western 
contexts. Within the limits of this study, Occidentalism has been exemplified via the 
EU’s role in the changing attitude towards the Kurdish Question during Turkey’s EU 
accession process.  
In this thesis, in the light of above-mentioned discussion, I suggested that 
Orientalism/Occidentalism, Center/Periphery are useful, yet underestimated, concepts to 
understand the Kurdish question, which can contribute to the theories employed so far. 
While this question cannot be reduced to these concepts, I argued that they can be used 
as effective tools to understand the power mechanism at play in the Kurdish Question in 
Turkey, especially in the time period encompassing the formation period of the republic. 
I argued that the Orientalism, as a theory that emphasized the power of the Orientalist to 
define the Orient and embark certain stereotypical images on the Orient, carries the 
potential of better understanding the impacts of the Kurdish question on the social 
fragmentation in Turkey. Hence is the importance of Orientalism as a concept that can 
be used in understanding the Kurdish question. In order to better understand this 
fragmentation, I chose to work on the way Kemalist elites, who assumed the role of the 
masses from the top on the model of the West, perceived their own eastern parts.  
On the other hand, starting with the 1990s, I argued that the Kurdish Question 
also seems to have undergone a transition both in terms of what it is and how it is 
considered by the state elites and Kemalist elites. I argued that the Orientalist ideology 
vis-a-vis the Kurdish Question relied on the already existing center and periphery 
cleavage until the 1990s. However, with the dissolution of the center and periphery in 
the 1990s, the CHP began to acknowledge the decreasing appeal of its identification 
with the western values and modernization on the model of western values. However, 
the fact that the CHP’s stance was ambivalent and in the process of transformation in 
the 1990s makes it hard for one to extend these evaluations to the 2000s. In that sense, 
the case analyzed here presents yet another example of the complications that arise from 
the experience of modernity in non-western contexts. Combination of dynamics such as 
  
87 
Turkey’s ambition for Western style modernism and the prospect of European Union 
accession, the emergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement as an inevitable 
phenomena that cannot be overlooked, and the reformation the CHP experiences seem 
to have played an important role in the way these new relationships were forged with 
the Kurds. On the other hand, the Kurds seem to have developed their own way of 
reacting to handling this dynamic in the form of insurgency, the internalization of the 
values attributed to them as well as forming a new identity vis-à-vis the state.  
 The history of the Kemalist policies addressing women constituted the second tier 
of this thesis, given the central place these policies took in the formation of the Turkish 
republic. These reforms served the Kemalist ideology in various ways. In the first place, 
they served to establish a new image of being a part of the civilized Western world. 
That is, the fact that Kemalist reforms addressing women were put into practice marked 
that Turkey’s place within the Western countries, which became a source of pride for 
Kemalists. Second, it created a group of “grateful” Kemalist women who were 
‘granted’ rights. While the republic gave public visibility to women, women, in return, 
served the republic as the “new face” of its Westernization task. The choice of the 
image of women was a subtle way of bringing visibility to an ideology, as it combines 
the symbols of being secular as opposed to being religious, progressive as opposed to 
“modern,” and European as opposed to Middle Eastern. Depending on to what extent 
women are secular, “modern,” or “western,” the messages of modernness and 
westernness are conveyed; indeed a very critical part of constructing the Turkish 
identity. In this sense, women stood at the crossroads of many powerful ideologies. In 
other words, the semiotics of women conveyed the messages of the state’s forming 
ideologies.  
Combination of the above-mentioned constituted the core of this thesis, which is 
a discourse analysis of the CHP Women’s Branch’s report on the conditions of women 
living in the southeastern regions of Turkey. The analysis of this pamphlet, together 
with the contextual research I carried out, provided me with the argument that the CHP 
was undergoing a transition, to which the pamphlet I analyzed is a testimony, in the 
1990s. This transition was in line with the dissolution of the center and periphery 
cleavage, which was demonstrated most clearly in the rise of radical Islamic movement 
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and the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question constituted one of the main challenges 
for the Turkish state and the CHP alike, as it was moving from the periphery and 
acquiring a central place in Turkish politics. In the first period of the 1990s, the CHP, 
together with the SHP, took important steps in acknowledging the Kurdish identity. 
However, this acknowledgement, not surprisingly, had its own ambivalences that still 
carried the marks of Orientalizing tendencies. 
 
In the 75th anniversary of the republic and the CHP, the inherent ties between 
these two groups were being shattered. The CHP was on the way of forming a more 
“civil” identity. During this process, it was looking for support from different layers of 
the society such as the southeastern region. The southeastern region was both a 
“proving ground” for the modernity of the CHP and a new territory on which the party 
could base its legitimacy. Hence was the apologetic tone of the pamphlet and the 
statements such as “people do not belong to the state, the state belongs to people.”  
Last but not least, the pamphlet I analyzed in this chapter suggests me that the 
CHP consulted, one more time, the symbolic role of women in conveying message of 
getting a new identity, by which I explain the inadequacy of the visibility of women in 
the pamphlet. The party allocated the women’s branch as a subsidiary/complementary 
role in the dissemination of its ideology. In a similar vein, although the pamphlet was 
the work of the women’s branch, the women who made this congress and the pamphlet 
possible could not take credit for it. Building up on these arguments, I aim that this 
thesis will contribute to the literature that focusses on the Kurdish Question with an 
emphasis on the societal fragmentation.  
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